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This paper examines the decentralization process in Colombia, particularly as it 
relates to reforms embodied in the 1991 Constitution, and the bailouts of 
territorial entities that have occurred in subsequent years as a result of perverse 
incentive structures. The paper provides a summary of the basic features of the 
decentralization process in Colombia, including an analysis of revenue and 
expenditure assignments, the intergovernmental transfer system and recent 
developments in terms of territorial indebtedness. Specific case studies involve 
the determinants of three types of bailouts by the central government to territorial 
entities: the provision of soft loans to be used by departments to restructure their 
finances, the bailout of territorial entitities’ education expenditures, and the 
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  61. Introduction   
 
Within the Latin American context Colombia is in a relatively advanced stage in terms of 
decentralization. According to the IDB (1997), it ranks third in the region after Argentina and 
Brazil, two countries organized as federal states. While in 1995 average public expenditure 
allocated by subnational governments amounted to 15 percent of total public expenditure in 
Latin America and to 35 percent in the OECD countries, it reached 39 percent in the case of 
Colombia. Economic activity is also very decentralized compared to other Latin American 
countries.
1 
This advanced stage of decentralization is the result of a process that began at the onset of 
the 1980s, and has covered aspects of economic, administrative and political nature. This process 
received a definitive push with the new Constitution of 1991. The development of a 
decentralized system for over 15 years has revealed its strengths and weaknesses, and has 
prompted the need to implement changes in order to correct existing problems. 
Historically, Colombia has shown a reasonable degree of macroeconomic stability,
2 but 
macroeconomic management deteriorated abruptly during the 1990s. One of the main causes for 
the fiscal imbalance has been the increase in the Central Government’s (CG) current 
expenditures, explained mostly by a large increase in transfers to the regions and new interest 
payments.  
Despite the large increase in transfers there have been several situations in which sub-
national governments have faced (or are facing) deep financial problems, especially at the 
departmental level. In recent years departments have been asking for special treatment, both in 
terms of their debt with the CG and/or in the request of loans to pay wages, pensions, and loans 
to the commercial banking system.  The accumulation of deficits and excessive departmental 
indebtedness exploded in 1996.  
                                             
1 Montenegro (1996) estimates Gini coefficients for the concentration of population in 19 Latin American countries. 
Colombia comes last in terms of concentration, with a Gini of 0.42, followed by Brazil (0.49), Venezuela (0.54), 
Bolivia (0.56) and Ecuador (0.57). The more regionally concentrated countries are Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala and 
Paraguay. 
2 During 1970-92 Colombia was the least volatile economy within the Latin American context (IMF, 1995), and had 
the most stable economic policy of the countries analyzed. Recently, Jaramillo, Steiner and Salazar (1999) tied the 
stability of economic policies to the stability of some institutions and to the constitutionalist character of its 
democracy, one in which the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a pluralistic society are counteracted by the 
cooperative attitude of the leaders of different segments of the population.   
  7As of February 1999, 15 departments had received loans from the CG for the 
restructuring of their administrative, financial and fiscal structures, totaling US$107 million, and 
there are 13 additional petitions on the waiting list. Payments to retirees are not current in 14 
departments, affecting around 18,000 persons.  According to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the 
delays are older than 12 months in four cases (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1999a). 
A system of “traffic lights” was designed to control regional indebtedness. A regional 
entity under green light can contract new credits, but the red light (low liquidity and solvency) 
forces the region to sign a performance agreement (PA) monitored by the MoF. Currently, of 27 
departments for which there are calculations, 17 are in red, 1 in yellow and 9 in green, which 
means 18 of them are facing liquidity and/or solvency problems.  
There are failures in the institutional framework of decentralization that have reduced the 
fiscal discipline of the sub-national governments, affecting its fiscal balance and increasing the 
pressure for a bailout from the CG. There is an unavoidable need to modify the fiscal contract 
among the three levels of government, in order to enhance the principal’s (CG) capacity to 
monitor and control the agent (territorial entities, TEs).  
This paper is divided into four sections, including the introduction. The second section 
provides a summary of the basic features of the decentralization process in Colombia, including 
an analysis of revenue and expenditure assignments, the intergovernmental transfer system and 
recent developments in terms of territorial indebtedness.  
The third section constitutes the core of the paper.  It deals with three types of bailouts by 
the CG and their determinants: the provision of soft loans to be used by departments to 
restructure their finances, the bailout of education expenditures of TEs, and, the case of the 
Metro of Medellin. The last section presents conclusions and some policy recommendations. 
 
1.  The Decentralization Process in Colombia
3 
 
A.  Current Political and Administrative Division  
 
Colombia is divided into departments, which in turn are composed of municipalities. There are 
32 departments and close to 1,090 municipalities, including four special districts: Bogota, 
Cartagena, Barranquilla and Santa Marta. Each department constitutes an electoral district for the 
                                             
3 This section draws heavily on Correa and Steiner (1999). 
  8election of governors, members of the House of Representatives (Cámara de Representantes) and 
deputies to the Departmental Assembly. Senators are elected on a national basis.  
The 1991 Constitution gave departments autonomy in the administration of sectional 
matters and in the planning and promotion of economic and social development within their 
territory.  The Departmental Assemblies are administrative corporations, elected by popular vote.  
Their size varies from 11 and 31 members, who serve three-year terms.  
The Governor is the legal representative and the administrative head of the Department, 
and acts as an agent of the President in relation to the management of public order, the execution 
of economic policy and as a bridge for agreements between the nation and the department. The 
governors are elected for three years, without the possibility of reelection, and they can be 
suspended or dismissed by the President.  
Municipalities represent the fundamental entity of the political and administrative 
division of the State.  The Municipal Councils are administrative corporations, elected by 
popular vote for a period of three years, with its size varying between 7 and 21 members.  The 
mayor, elected for three years, is the head of the local administration and its legal representative. 
Reelection is not allowed, and the mayors can be suspended or dismissed by the President or the 
Governor of the department. 
  
B.  Stages of Decentralization, 1982-2000 
 
In 1982-1991, during the early stages of the decentralization process, the dominant goal was to 
achieve fiscal independence among levels of government while protecting the budget balance at 
the central level (Rojas and Campbell, 1994). The most aggressive efforts in the areas of fiscal 
and administrative decentralization were concentrated in two laws. Law 14 of 1983 restructured 
tax structures, allowing lower levels of government to define tariff rates and exemption 
mechanisms within limits determined by the law.  Law 12 of 1986 (and Decree 77 of 1987) 
redistributed functions among levels of government, strengthened the system of CG transfers and 
established the co-financing system, a matching grant system that allowed the CG to participate 
in the funding and implementation of projects assigned to municipalities and departments.  
Modifications to the provision of education and health were implemented in 1989 and 
1990. Mayors became responsible for the appointment of teachers and for the administration of 
school payrolls and other expenses. The CG was made responsible for designing health policies, 
  9for transferring resources to subnational levels, and for overall coordination and supervision. The 
nation was given the monopoly over lotteries and gambling activities, the rents from which 
should be dedicated to finance health programs. Departments and municipalities were made 
responsible for executing those programs directly or through contracts with the private sector.   
The pace of decentralization intensified with the new Constitution of 1991, which reads 
in its first article: “Colombia is a legally organized social state under the form of a unitary, 
decentralized Republic with autonomous regional entities.” The main reform regarding political 
decentralization was to establish the popular election of governors. The new Constitution gave 
greater fiscal autonomy to municipal and departmental authorities, which now have the right to 
administer and modify taxes so as to comply with their assigned functions.  In terms of 
responsibilities, it dictates that the different territorial levels will be guided by the principles of 
coordination, concurrence and subsidiarity.  
The Constitution additionally modifies the system of transfers, establishing new rules for 
departments and special districts (Situado Fiscal, education and health), for municipalities 
(participation in the CG’s current revenues), and for the distribution of royalties from natural 
resources. Most importantly, it introduces the principle of balance between functions and 
resources by stating that no new resources can be given to lower levels of government without 
the previous assignment of responsibilities. This principle has been systematically violated, as 
will be seen below. 
 
C.  Revenue and Expenditure Assignments, Vertical Imbalances and Transfers 
 
1.  Expenditures and Taxes 
 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of expenditures and taxes by the central government and by the 
departments and municipalities in Colombia between 1990 and 2000. Panel 1a shows total 
expenditures and taxes, and panels 1b and 1c present the evolution of the different components. 
Table A.1 provides detailed information on taxes. Colombia was the country where public 
expenditure grew the most in Latin America during the 1990s (Echavarría, 2000)—from 20.4 
percent of GDP in 1990 to 37.7 percent in 2000, while taxes remained relatively constant, at 
levels close to 14 percent of GDP.  The gap has been widening over time, with important and 
negative consequences for the amount of public debt. 
  10Expenditure by departments and municipalities displayed a similar level to the CG in 
1992 but increased faster during the rest of the decade. All expenditures considered in the figure 
increased during the 1990s, including social security and the decentralized firms.  
Panel 1c and Table A.1 show the evolution of revenues at different levels. Taxes from the 
CG represent 5 times those of the departments and municipalities, and transfers close to 3 times. 
Transfers (3 points of GDP) and municipal taxes (1 point) increased faster than the other items 
considered in the panel. 
The central government collects income and value-added taxes, as well as taxes on 
international trade, while the departments collect taxes on liquor and beer, and the Municipalities 
collect industry, business and property taxes. The property tax is charged on the assessed value, 
mainly determined by a centralized government agency.
4 Additionally, there has been an optional 
surcharge on gasoline at the municipal level since 1993 (classified as a non-tax resource), which 
was made mandatory by the 1998 national tax reform.   
A recent report by the Inter-American Development Bank (BID, 1998) highlighted 
several limitations of the current territorial tax regime. First, an excessive number of taxes 
generate little revenue and are inefficient. In many instances, departments and municipalities 
administer taxes of a very similar nature.  Second, taxation power remains highly centralized. 
Third, administration is highly fragmented, organized by taxes rather than functions, and with 
functions overlapping among the divisions. Moreover, there is almost no systematic program of 
inspection and collection.   
The system of transfers corresponds mainly to a revenue sharing system, and it is 
expressed in four mechanisms considered in Table A.1: Situado Fiscal, a transfer for regional 
education and health; municipal participations, a transfer to municipalities to finance current 
expenditure and investment in basic services; royalties, from the exploitation of natural 
resources; and co-financing,  a matching grant system executed by the departments and 
municipalities. Table A.1 also includes the educational compensation fund (FEC), additional 
money for education, whose characteristics will be considered in Section 1.B.3.  
The Situado Fiscal and municipal participations represent the bulk of the transfer system, 
growing exponentially between 1991 and 1999 (with a small drop in 2000). Royalties and FEC 
                                             
4 Some major cities have used self-assessment of property values, with positive results in terms of revenue. 
  11became important after 1995. The system of co-financing was eliminated after 1998; it reached a 
peak of 0.9% of GDP in 1996. 
 
Figure 1. Expenditures and Taxes in Colombia, 1991-2000 (% of GDP) 
1
























































Source: Banco de la República (2001); Borradores de Economía, No.174, 







































































































































*: Decentralized entities include mai nly regional lotteries; social protection at the local level;  cadastral offices, etc.
Source: Banco de la República (2001); Borradores de Economía, No.174, Contralor’ia General de la República; Stei ner and 










2. Expenditure  Assignment 
 
Two patterns of decentralization overlap in Colombia, and the conflict between the two became 
more evident after 1991. There is the idea, on the one hand, that the central government (the 
principal) should design all policies, and local governments (the agent) should execute them. But 
others think that local authorities should define policies at the regional level and obtain their 
income directly from local potential voters.
5 The hybrid character should imply that the TE is 
                                             
5 According to the IMF (1995) “decentralization in Colombia favors a model of functional administration, where the 
center takes the decisions, and asks local entities to execute them.” For the opposite view see Steiner and Soto 
(1999, p. 126). See also Kure (1995) and  Clavijo (1998). 
  12accountable to both the CG and its constituents, but that has not been the case. The confusion 
that exists has allowed the TE to avoid its responsibilities with both the CG and the citizens.  
There is also a remarkable lack of clarity regarding the distribution of responsibilities 
among the different levels of government in the Constitution of 1991 and in the related 
legislation that followed it. The result is interference by upper levels of government and special 
interests, with lower levels demanding support from higher levels, and widespread weak 
accountability at all levels of government. The CG remains involved even when responsibilities 
have been transferred to the lower levels.  
Table 1 describes the overlapping functions in the provision of different public services 
in Colombia.  According to the Constitution of 1991, a new Organic Law (Ley de Ordenamiento 
Territorial) prevailing over all other related legislation should be drafted to define precisely the 
functions and responsibilities for each level of government, but has not been presented by the 
government to Congress. This Organic Law should prevail.  
On the other hand, the current law did not require the CG to stop playing a key role in the 
areas of education and health, or in other areas of decentralization. Central government 
expenditures on education and health increased from 0.9 percent of GDP in 1991 to 2.7 percent 
in 1997, while local expenditures increased from 3.3 percent to 5.4 percent in the same period. 
Expenditure carried out by the National Public Administration still amounted to 25.6 percent of 
GDP in 1995, while departmental administrations carried out 5.3 percent and the municipalities 
5.7 percent. This helps to explain why the CG has been facing continual and increasing fiscal 
deficits since 1993.  
  13Table 1. Distribution of Functions by Level of Government 
PUBLIC SERVICE AMOUNT STRUCTURE EXECUTION SUPERVISION
National Defense NNN N
Natural Resources (Oil) NN N , D , M N
Education
Elementary N,D,M N,D N,D,M N
High School N,D N,D N,D N
Universities NNN N
Health N,D,M D,M N,D,M N
Housing N,M N,D,M M M
Hospitals N,D,M N,D,M N,D N
Water Service and Sewerage MMM N
Public Transportation MMM M
Streets MMM M
Waste Disposal and Cleaning MMM N
Public Lighting N,M N N,M N
Highways N,D N,D N,D N,D
Telecomunications N,M N,M N,M N
Ports N,M N,M N,M N
Source: IDB, 1997. N: National, D: Departmental, M: Municipal Amount: Who decides the amount to be spent? Structure: Who decides the expenditure
structure? Execution: Who executes the expenditure? Supervision: Who supervises the function?  
  
3.  Vertical Imbalances and Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of fiscal effort, the relation between taxes and total revenues, for 
the national government, the departments and the municipalities. It has been relatively stable and 
high for the national level, and it has decreased markedly and reached low levels for the 
departments, dropping from 56.5 percent in 1991 to only 23 percent in 1999.  Fiscal effort fell 
markedly for the municipalities between 1991 and 1999, but bounced back to the original levels 
in 1999 (mainly due to the good behavior of Bogota in the latter year). Similar results are 
obtained for the departments and municipalities when we calculate the relation between taxes 
and total revenues less transfers. 
 






























































•  Situado Fiscal 
 
The Situado Fiscal was created in 1968 as a transfer to Regional Education and Health Funds, 
but departments did not receive resources directly since the regional managers were appointed at 
the central level. The 1991 Constitution called for giving money directly to the regions and stated 
that the amount transferred to departments and municipalities should be an increasing proportion 
of current revenue until it reaches 46.5 percent in 2002 (Table 2), a solution not without 
problems.
6 According to Law 60 of 1993, 15 percent of total revenue of the Situado is to be 
distributed equally among departments and special districts, the remaining 85 percent according 
to a formula (Table 3).   
The 15 percent to be distributed equally favors smaller departments, sparsely populated 
and with low administrative capacity, mainly those created by the 1991 Constitution.
7 At least 60 
                                             
6 The dependence of transfers on current revenue limited discretional behavior but also had negative effects: it 
institutionalized the lack of correspondence between transfers and costs (the main criteria are geographical, 
demographical and sectoral), and it introduced a procyclical element into transfers that complicates macroeconomic 
management (IDB, 1998). 
7 Their expenditure needs should be lower. Obviously, other factors affect needs, including the prices of the inputs 
used to produce services (Rafuse, 1990).   
  15percent of the Situado should go to education and 20 percent to health.  The departments can 
assign the remaining 20 percent to either education or health.
8  
 
Table 2. Transfers of Central Government Current Revenue in the Constitution of 1991 
(% of current revenue) 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Participations (Municipalities) 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 22.0
Situado Fiscal (Departments) 22.5 23 23.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5
Total 36.5 38 39.5 41.5 42.5 43.5 44.5 45.5 46.5 46.5
Source: Constitution of 1991.  
 
Table 3. Transfers to Departments and Special Districts, Situado Fiscal 
Formulae for Geographical distribution 
 
15%
To be distributed in equal parts
among all the departments and districts
Variable share which should guarantee Portion to be distributed according
enough resources (adding up the 15% to the following criteria:
of the previous column) to cover the same  1. Potential population of the T.E
health and educational services produced 2. Fiscal effort (share of all resources 
in 1992, under conditions of administrativein total state income).
efficiency.





•  Municipal Participations 
 
Municipal participations represent transfers to municipalities, designed to finance current 
expenditure and investment in basic services (health, education, water provision, sanitation, 
sports, recreation and culture). The share of current income to be transferred to municipalities 
represented 14 percent in 1993 and should increase to 22 percent in 2002.  
The geographic distribution of the participations follows a complicated formula (Table 
4). Like the Situado, the participations are for the most part earmarked, and the municipalities 
can freely allocate only 20 percent of these resources (Table 5).
9 
 
                                             
8 75 percent of total expenditures have gone to education, and 25 percent to health.  
9 After a couple of years, some municipalities, especially the smaller ones, were unable to finance their operating 
and debt service expenditures due to lack of own tax revenue. As a result, legislative Act 01/95 increased the 
percentage of transfers that can be freely allocated by municipalities with a lower degree of relative development. 
  16Table 4. Geographic Distribution of Participations to Municipalities 
 
x% Indian Territories (the share is determined by a certain amount of per capita income)
5.0% Municipalities with less than 50.000 inhabitants
1.5% Municipalities on Magdalena river
0.1% Federacion Colombiana de Municipios
Distribution criteria:
(93.4-x)% 60% 20% According to population with basic unsatisfied needs (UBN)
40% According to relative poverty indexes
40% 22% Population / Total national population
6% According to fiscal efficiency
6% According to administrative efficiency in public services supply
6% According to the evolution of an indicator of quality of life
Source: Law 60 of 1993  
 




Water and Sanitation 20%
Culture and Recreation 5%
Discretional 20%
Source: Law 60 of 1993.  
 
•  Co-Financing Funds 
 
The co-financing funds were established as a matching grant system in 1992, allowing the CG to 
pursue specific priorities to be executed at the territorial level. The funds’ level and composition 
are defined in the executive’s budget and assigned through negotiations at the congressional 
level. Once defined, the relevant ministries determine the technical, financial and institutional 
conditions. Municipalities identify, formulate and execute projects, while the departments 
coordinate, promote, plan and evaluate them.  
The allocation of resources to the funds and their geographical distribution are 
characterized by an arbitrary process, subject to strong political pressure. There are global items 
in the budget (partidas globales) that correspond to allocations managed directly by specific 
congressmen, representing around 20 percent of total resources allocated through the funds in 
1996 (BID, 1998).  
The co-financing funds are divided into two kinds: specific destination and free 
allocation. The former are approved in the budget, and the latter are allocated directly by the 
  17funds in order to finance projects presented by the TEs.
10 The criteria for assigning funds to TEs 
are similar to those used to distribute the Situado and participations, so the geographical 
distribution of grants tends to follow that of transfers, rather than national investment priorities. 
The programs, on the other hand, are independently formulated by the different agencies 
involved in the process, with indeterminate criteria for project selection and cost sharing 
(Fedesarrollo, 1998).  
 
•  Royalties 
 
The purpose of royalties is to distribute the resources generated from the exploitation of natural 
resources. Once the amount is determined, royalties are distributed to departments and 
municipalities involved in production and transportation.  A share goes to the National Royalties 
Fund, to be distributed to the rest of the TEs. Currently, 28 departments and 328 municipalities 
receive royalties (IDB, 1998).   
Departments are required to invest 100 percent of resources from royalties in priority 
projects included in their development plans, but at least 50 percent of royalties should be 
directed towards health, education, water and sewerage when there are “deficits” in terms of 
coverage.  
The distribution of royalties is highly skewed, and those departments with small 
populations have received a large share and misused resources.  Departments with large royalties 
levy relatively few taxes, and a large share of royalties has financed current expenditure rather 
than investment.  
 
D. Territorial  Indebtedness,  Performance Agreements and “Traffic Lights”  
 
1. General  Considerations 
 
The greater autonomy for contracting credit that the TEs received in the 1991 Constitution, the 
lack of regulation, more potential leverage given by the new transfers, and the aggressive 
behavior of banks, produced a rapid increase in TE indebtedness, especially in 1992-94, the term 
of the first elected governors.  
                                             
10 There are four funds: Fondo de Inversión Social (FIS), for social investment; Fondo para la Inversión Rural 
(DRI), for infrastructure projects in rural areas; Fondo de Cofinanciación de Vías (FCV), for intercity roads; and 
Fondo para la Infraestructura Urbana (FIU), for municipal transport. 
  18With the exception of a registration requirement, domestic credit operations by TEs were 
free of Ministry of Finance control until 1993, but in that year Law 80 introduced important new 
restrictions. Financial intermediaries were now required to monitor the destination of loans and 
the indebtedness capacity of TEs. In addition, banks were made responsible for grading loans, 
constituting provisions for non-performing assets, and monitoring the nature and quantity of 
acceptable guarantees.  Loans to TEs, moreover, were now calculated in banks’ equity to risk-
weighted assets ratio.  
It is not clear, though, whether the decentralization process has brought important 
improvements in the areas of education and health. Education coverage did not increase in the 
large cities, and the quality of secondary public education has deteriorated in relative terms (i.e., 
compared to private education). Coverage in small municipalities increased, but the main 
beneficiaries were the teachers, whose wages increased much more than those of others during 
the 1990s. Improvements in health were notable, but they seem to have responded more to the 
incentives created by Law 100 than to decentralization.
11 
 
2.  Performance Agreements and Traffic Lights 
 
It was not until 1997 that Law 358 introduced the constitutional mandate of limiting debt to 
payment capacity, establishing a system of “traffic lights” based on indicators of liquidity 
(interest payment/operational savings) and solvency (debt/current revenue).
12  As described in 
Table 6, a regional entity with a liquidity indicator lower than 40 percent and a solvency 
indicator lower than 80 percent has a “green light” and total autonomy to contract new credits. A 
performance agreement (PA) has to be signed, however, when the region is in the red light range 
(liquidity indicator between 40 percent and 60 percent and solvency indicator lower than 80 
percent) or in some cases in the yellow light zone.
13 
The PA is based on a negotiation between the regional entity and the financial institution, 
monitored and reviewed by the Division of Fiscal Support (División de Apoyo Fiscal, DAF) at 
the Ministry of Finance. A department can additionally monitor the agreement when one of its 
                                             
11 See Alesina, Carrasquilla and Echavarría (2002), Gaviria (2002), and Acosta  and Borjas (2002). 
12 A better indicator of solvency would relate liabilities to net worth. 
13 When the new credit increases the real value of the stock of debt. This means that debt can be rolled over 
automatically in the yellow zone, though not in the red zone.  
  19municipalities new credit is given to one of its municipalities.
14 Access to future credit is limited 
in case of non-compliance. 
 
Table 6. Indebtedness Alert Signals 
Indicator Autonomous indebtedness  Intermediate Indebtedness Critical Indebtedness
Green Light Yellow Light Red Light
Debt Interests / Operational Savings* <40% 40%<60% >60%
(Liquidity indicator)
Debt balance / Current revenue <80% <80% >80%
(Solvency indicator)
Effect ET is allowed to contract A) ET can contract autonomouslAuthorization is required
new credit autonomously B) Requires indebtedness  to celebrate credit 
authorization of the Ministry operations, thus a Performance
of Finance or the Department, Agreement with the 
which will be conditioned to the financial entities should
signing of a Performance Plan de signed
with the Financial Institutions
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda
* operational savings is defined as current revenue – current expenditure (excluding interest payments).  
 
The PA consists of a series of targets and recommendations that the TE must comply 
with, within a predetermined time frame. These targets include increases in own resources, 
control of expenditures, generation of current savings and surpluses and an improved debt 
profile.  There are also limits to the evolution of total wages.
15 The agreement specifies that 
information procedures should be improved in order to guarantee access by the central 
government and a census of the taxpayers must be available. New programs aiming to avoid tax 
evasion and smuggling should be designed, and tax receipts should increase by more than 20 
percent annually. 
Table 7 presents estimates of the legal capacity of indebtedness of departments and 
capital cities in 1998. Of the 27 departments for which estimates are presented, 17 are in red, 1 in 
yellow and 9 in green. Most of the liquidity problems can be traced to negative operational 
savings. The problem seems to be less acute for muncipalities than departments: 13 of 26 cases 
are in red, 6 in yellow, and 8 in green. 
 
                                             
14 Further regulation developed the risk weighting that financial institutions must apply to TE loans. Operations 
under green light should be computed for 100 percent of their value, and operations under yellow and red (with 
authorization) for 130 percent. However, when these operations have the CG’s guarantee, they will be computed for 
0 percent of their value. This distinction, as will be developed later on, obviously constitutes a perverse incentive. 
15 Total wages cannot increase more than the percentage allowed each year for unit wages of public employees. This 
is (relatively) similar to keeping constant the number of public employees. 
  20Table 7. Legal Capacity of Indebtedness in 1998 
 
DEPARTMENT LIQUIDITY* SOLVENCY* LIQUIDITY SOLVENCY SITUATION
VALLE (23.7)               222.3                                                         RED RED RED
ANTIOQUIA (163.4)             46.9                                                           RED GREEN RED
ATLANTICO 339.0               65.2                                                           RED GREEN RED
TOLIMA (13.1)               86.6                                                           RED RED RED
NARIÑO (64.7)               186.5                                                         RED RED RED
MAGDALENA (18.2)               57.0                                                           RED GREEN RED
HUILA (30.5)               11.5                                                           RED GREEN RED
CESAR 70.6                 38.0                                                           RED GREEN RED
SANTANDER 106.9               11.1                                                           RED GREEN RED
CALDAS (7.6)                 16.0                                                           RED GREEN RED
BOLIVAR 273.5               5.2                                                             RED GREEN RED
SUCRE 233.8               22.7                                                           RED GREEN RED
QUINDIO (4.8)                 12.2                                                           RED GREEN RED
AMAZONAS (1.2)                 101.3                                                         RED RED RED
VAUPES (0.5)                 81.2                                                           RED RED RED
VICHADA (4.2)                 28.0                                                           RED GREEN RED
CORDOBA (326.3)             -                                                             RED GREEN RED
N. DE SANTANDER 47.4                 10.9                                                           YELLOW GREEN YELLOW
CUNDINAMARCA 9.6                   30.8                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
RISARALDA 19.8                 39.6                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
GUAJIRA 12.7                 76.9                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
ARAUCA 16.8                 14.8                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
CAUCA 30.1                 18.3                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
BOYACA 17.4                 11.6                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
CAQUETA 7.2                   9.2                                                             GREEN GREEN GREEN
PUTUMAYO 27.5                 13.6                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
META 30.7                 -                                                             GREEN GREEN GREEN
MUNICIPALITY
MEDELLIN (87.5)               26.4                                                           RED GREEN RED
BARRANQUILLA 94.2                 29.2                                                           RED GREEN RED
SANTAFE DE BOGOTA D.C. 105.9               7.0                                                             RED GREEN RED
CARTAGENA (72.6)               44.7                                                           RED GREEN RED
TUNJA 78.3                 27.5                                                           RED GREEN RED
FLORENCIA 209.5               36.5                                                           RED GREEN RED
POPAYAN 67.4                 42.7                                                           RED GREEN RED
MONTERIA 103.9               333.9                                                         RED RED RED
NEIVA (12.3)               32.6                                                           RED GREEN RED
SANTA MARTA 102.5               44.6                                                           RED GREEN RED
BUCARAMANGA 128.7               94.3                                                           RED RED RED
PASTO (18.5)               48.6                                                           RED GREEN RED
INIRIDA (7.3)                 99.5                                                           RED RED RED
PEREIRA 52.9                 26.1                                                           YELLOW GREEN YELLOW
MANIZALES 45.9                 74.0                                                           YELLOW GREEN YELLOW
SINCELEJO 44.0                 35.6                                                           YELLOW GREEN YELLOW
IBAGUE 43.1                 5.1                                                             YELLOW GREEN YELLOW
CALI 49.7                 -                                                             YELLOW GREEN YELLOW
CALI 49.7                 53.6                                                           YELLOW GREEN YELLOW
VILLAVICENCIO 22.7                 19.5                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
ARMENIA 16.8                 19.2                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
ARAUCA 27.1                 63.7                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
YOPAL 30.0                 67.2                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
MOCOA 16.4                 31.6                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
LETICIA 21.4                 15.6                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
MITU -                  26.8                                                           GREEN GREEN GREEN
PUERTO CARRENO 5.2                   6.4                                                             GREEN GREEN GREEN
Source: DNP




According to the National Federation of Departments (1999), the use of transfers as 
leverage for indebtedness (Law 85 of 1995) resulted in TE financing current expenditures with 
loans, and, in many cases, paying debt service with new credits.  Debt service increasingly 
compromised all sources of revenue, since they had been used as collateral. Resources were 
  21turned over directly to financial institutions without even going through the government’s 
“cashier.”  
As a result, regional governments postponed payments to contractors, employees and 
retirees, or relied on liquidity loans and overdrafts. These short run loans became recurrent and 
were not repaid during the year, as mandated. It is important to stress that these practices cannot 
get done without the connivance of the financial institutions.  
In order to address the critical situation faced by the departments of Chocó, Nariño and 
Putumayo in 1995 the CG loaned them resources and, as a condition, each department had to 
sign performance agreements (PAs) with the Ministry of Finance. Since 1996 the Ministry has 
received an increasing flow of petitions of support and created the PASFFIET (Program of 
Support for Fiscal Reorganization and Institutional Development of TEs) to address them in a 
systematic way.  
Decree 488 of 1999 relaxed some of the restrictions on extending credit due to difficulties 
faced in the signing of agreements under the PASFFIET, especially because of lack of interest on 
the part of financial intermediaries.
16 In particular, the weighting for entities with red light status 
decreased to 100 percent if an agreement with the Ministry of Finance, within the PASFFIET, 
was signed. If there is national guarantee, financial intermediaries are allowed to reduce the 
weighting by the percentage guaranteed by the Nation.  This means that the central government 
assumes the new obligations; the legislation goes in the wrong direction and a moral hazard 
problem clearly emerges.  
The indebtedness law has not been effective. Some entities with red light status have 
contracted new credits without permission of the MoF. Of the 21 departments that required 
permission for new loans in 1997, 10 apparently obtained new credit without permission from 
the Ministry and five other departments that were authorized entered into performance 
agreements that were impossible to comply with (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1999a). Departments 
presented defective financial information in order to circumvent the law, and the financial 
institutions engaged in only superficial analysis of the data. In addition, in some instances the 
Ministry of Finance gave authorization in cases when it should have been denied.  “Drunk” 
regions, like drunk people, do not respect traffic lights.  
                                             
16 It has been argued that financial intermediaries did not believe in the diagnosis or the proposed solutions 
contained in the agreements. 
  22PAs have also being signed with the Ministry of Finance, outside the PASSFIET. One 
agreement was signed between the department of Valle (which had the largest debt in 1997, 23 
percent of the total debt of departments) and its creditors, with little CG involvement. 
 
3.  Regional Debt and the Financial System
17 
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of domestic and foreign debt between 1990 and 2001 for the central 
government, the departments and municipalities, and for the other decentralized entities. CG’s 
total debt exploded during the 1990s, from 16.5 percent of GDP in 1990 to 43 percent in 2001, to 
finance the huge gap described in Figure 1. Total debt for other decentralized entities
18 
represented 5.2 percent of GDP in 2001, much more than for municipalities (2.0 percent of GDP) 
and departments (1.2 percent).  It increased very fast for departments and municipalities between 
1990 and 1997 but remained relatively stable after 1997. Debt fell smoothly during the 1990s for 
the decentralized entities, mainly due to the relative contraction of foreign debt.  
Debt in constant col $ increased, between 1990 and 1997 at huge annual rates of 25 
percent, 22 percent, 15 percent and 14 percent for municipalities, departments, the CG and other 
regional entities, respectively; the corresponding figures for 1990-2001 were 14 percent, 12 
percent, 18 percent and 7 percent. The comparison shows the very large expansion of CG’s debt 
after 1997 and the relative improvement for other regional entities. 
The amount of foreign debt in 2001 was similar to domestic debt for the decentralized 
entities, while it has been nil for the departments and relatively small for the municipalities. 
More research is needed in the area, however, since the large amounts of debt originating in the 
regional pension system are not included.
19 
 
                                             
17 This section is based on Asociación Bancaria (2000). 
18 Include mainly regional lotteries and social protection at the local level such as supervisory boards, assessors’ 
offices, etc. See Figure 1b. 
19 Debt with “contratistas” is not included, either, but it seems to be relatively unimportant, representing close to 12 
percent of total regional debt. 
  23Figure 3. Domestic and Foreign Debt (% of GDP) 
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Debt, Decentralized Entities  Debt, Decentralized Entities 

































































Source: Contraloría General de la República and author’s calculations.
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The financial system is still in a precarious situation (Arbeláez, Echavarría and Gaviria, 
2002) and its exposure to TEs is one important factor. Figure 4 shows that the participation of 
regional loans (in the total loans of the Colombian financial system) increased from 14.3 percent 
in 1995 to 20.8 percent in 2001; the increase was equally shared by other regional entities (1.8 
additional points), the departments (2.4 points) and the municipalities (2.2 points). 
Finally, the quality of regional loans has been deteriorating fast—a cause of great 
concern. Thus, the relation between nonperforming loans and total loans jumped from 11.2 
percent in 1998 to 60.6 percent in 2000 for the departments, and from 11 percent to 50 percent 
for the municipalities. A regional default could certainly hit the Colombian financial system. 
Nonperforming loans for the whole country moved from 13.1 percent in 1998 to 16.8 percent in 
2000. 
 
   

















































4.  Recent Developments: Some Relatively Good News 
 
As noted in the previous section, the debt situation of the Tes has improved recently. Market 
discipline operated and banks simply stopped lending during the crisis of 1998-2000 (Arbeláez 
Echavarría and Gaviria, 2002), but recent measures also had a favorable impact. Some of them 
were motivated by the knowledge that a TE default with a private bank would end up being paid 
by the CG.  
There have been important cuts in regional expenditures, increases in taxes, debt control 
measures and more fiscal responsibility in some of the reforms adopted in 2000-2002. In fact, oil 
and the fiscal adjustment of the TEs has allowed Colombia to reach the fiscal goals agreed upon 
with the IMF. Just as importantly, Colombia accepted the idea that regions are different, and they 
should have different relations with the CG during a “transition period.”   
Zapata, Acosta and Gonzáles (2001) present a detailed review of some of the most 
important recent legislation in the area, and we will only introduce here a brief summary of 
them:  
Law 549 of 1999, which created FONPET (the national fund to cover the liabilities of the 
TEs), provides additional money from the CG and from the TEs to cover the pension system 
  25liabilities at the regional level. Most of the increase in transfers to the regions between 2000 and 
2002 (Table 2), 20 percent of national royalties, and the resources from potential future 
privatizations will go to this fund.  
Law 617 of 2000 creates limits to the current expenditures of the TEs and creates seven 
different categories of departments and municipalities. The small-poor municipalities and 
departments can spend 80 percent of their current income on operational expenditures (wages, 
interests and general expenditures), while the limit for large-rich TEs is 50 percent. Some public 
wages (mayor, Assembly member, etc.) vary among the seven categories, and there are limits to 
the size and growth of public wages in the TE.  
The Legislative Act 012 of 2001 modified Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution of 
1991 and created the General System of Participations (Sistema General de Participaciones), 
which subsumes the old Situado Fiscal, the FEC and the municipal participations. It also delinks 
regional transfers from the CG’s current income until 2008.
20 
Law 715 of 2001 improves the criteria used in Law 60 for regional expenditures in 
education and health. Thus, for example, transfers are now assigned according to the number of 
children enrolled at the schools for each TE, instead of the complicated previous rules for 
Situado Fiscal (Table 3) or the obscure or non-existent rules of FEC (Section 1.B.1). It was a 
politically sensitive issue opposed by FECODE, the powerful teacher’s union. Nonetheless, it is 
clearly better to assign money for education based on the number of children covered than by the 
value of total wages for education in each TE.  
The recent measures imply a return to the old principal-agent model, however, where the 
central government (the principal) designs policies, and local governments (the agent) execute 
them. Greater fiscal discipline is assured, but efficiency would suffer without accountability and 
autonomy at the local level.  The debate will continue, of course, and some authors have 
proposed a radical change in the decentralization model in the opposite direction: regions should 
be totally free to choose the type of expenditures required, and regional debt should be prohibited 
(Alesina, Carrasquilla and Echavarría, 2000).
21  
                                             
20 But real transfers should grow 2.5 percent per year between 2002 and 2004, and 2.0 percent between 2004 and 
2008. 
21 Regions can only obtain some lending from the CG against next year transfers. Alesina’s proposals also consider 
that taxes should be collected at the central level and returned to the regions according to GDP. Redistribution 
should be implemented via the creation of a special fund where the rich regions give money to poor regions. 
  263.  Different Types of Bailouts   
 
The previous section described the main elements of inter-governmental relations in Colombia 
and the main obstacles to imposing fiscal discipline on the TEs. At various times and through 
different mechanisms the territorial entities were bailed out, paying debt with new loans from the 
central government. This section will describe the circumstances under which the CG has 
extended bailouts, with the final objective of identifying the institutional framework that 
promoted them.  
Three types of bailouts will be analyzed. Section 1.A will analyze the provision of loans 
by the CG to be used by the departments in their financial restructuring and the characteristics of 
the PA agreements (Type 1). Section 1.B
22 will consider the violation of the contract that settled 
the criteria for assigning transfers for financing school education (Situado Fiscal), and the 
expansion of the Situado by means of the Educational Compensation Fund (FEC); this is Type 2.  
Finally, the specific case of the Medellin Metro will be considered in Section 1.C. 
In the first case (PAs), the CG implemented a restructuring program by conditioning the 
TE’s access to new loans to the signing of performance agreements (PAs). As explained in 
Section I.D, the credit contracts have not been enforced, and some departments have signed more 
than one agreement when the first was violated and financial conditions have worsened.  
The second case involves the expansion of the Situado Fiscal by means of the 
Educational Compensation Fund (FEC). Since the Constitution of 1991, the Situado Fiscal has 
financed access to preschool and basic education (primary and secondary up to ninth grade), and 
it has been shown that it should be possible to finance almost all the educational needs with the 
money from the Situado (Vargas and Sarmiento, 1997).  
However, an agreement signed between the CG and the teacher’s union in 1995 created 
another fund (the Educational Compensation Fund, or FEC) to finance a “deficit of Situado” and 
some additional education expenditures by departments and municipalities. In its first year, 1996, 
the FEC represented 7.5 percent of the Situado, and 31.7 percent in 1998. The CG recently 
announced the elimination of the FEC, but this idea lasted only weeks, and the Nation is 
currently trying to negotiate with the departments the allocation of FEC resources subject to the 
                                             
22 Limitations of information prevented the analysis of another bailout experience: CG’s involvement in secondary 
and tertiary road systems. The Law states that these items should strictly be a TE responsibility 
  27signing of new PAs. Neither the CG nor the departments, have the backing of the main force, the 
national teacher’s union (FECODE). 
The final case involves the rail system built in Medellin. The project could not be 
defended on technical grounds, but the government justified its undertaking on the basis of 
highly doubtful externalities and as the instrument for the economic recovery of Antioquia. 
President Betancur, born in the region, was the project’s main supporter. The project was 
virtually bankrupt at the end of the 1980s, when the Nation started servicing the train’s foreign 
debt, and the region has recurrently defaulted on payments. 
All three cases of bailouts started as ad hoc interventions by the CG to support a TE in 
crisis. They became common practice in a very short time, increasing in size, and the CG was 
unable to enforce a commitment to its announced policies. A trade-off took place between 
beneficial short-run interventions and long-run reputation and incentives (Wildasin, 1997).  
The paper also discusses a number of determinants of Bailout Types 1 and 2 in Colombia. 
Possibilities include the characteristics of the tax base, political considerations and institutional 
arrangements.  
 
A.  Bailout Type 1: Restructuring Central Government Loans To Departments 
 
1.  Early Experiences and PAs
23 
 
In 1995 the CG launched a program to assist Chocó, Putumayo and Nariño, three departments 
with structural fiscal deficits and negative current savings. The idea was to give them soft credits 
and technical assistance to achieve a healthy financial situation. The recovery was to be attained 
by following the conditions agreed upon on in the Performance Agreements (PA) that each of 
them should sign.  
Table 8. Indicators for Chocó, Nariño and Putumayo 
 
CHOCO NARIÑO PUTUMAYO
Loan in millions of pesos 3,000 2,860 3,200
Loan in  millions of dollars 3.3 3.1 3.5
Date of PA Jul-95 Sep-95 Jul-95
Loan / Department's Current Revenue 77% 24% 74%
Population 363,438 1,192,515 237,166
Per capita GDP (% of National per capita) 28.33% 43.76% 16.98%
Per capita current revenue (% of National per capita) 34.33% 32.63% 58.82%
Per capita general expenditure (% of National per capita) 82.10% 73.90% 163.40%
Current Savings / Current Revenues % 5.5 -14.4 -16.5
Source: Gutiérrez, 1996.  
                                             
23 This section includes information from Gutiérrez (1996) and from PAs signed by the TEs.  
  28The loans were large, especially in the case of Chocó and Putumayo, representing 77 
percent and 74 percent, respectively of their 1994 current revenue (Table 8). The three 
departments were small, meagerly populated, and with per capita GDP and revenue collection 
well below the national average; the per capita GDP of Chocó and Nariño amounted to a third of 
the national average.  In the case of Putumayo, a department highly dependent on oil royalties, 
the share of income from taxes was only a quarter of the national average. These limitations in 
terms of income were not mirrored by their expenditures: per capita general expenditures were 
close to the average in Chocó and Nariño, and 60 percent higher in the case of Putumayo. All 
three had negative current savings. Table 9 shows the main loans made to each of the three 
departments in 1995-1998. 
 
Table 9. Indicators for Chocó, Nariño and Putumayo 
 
DEPARTMENT DATE U$ MILLIONS
CHOCO Jul-95 3.3
CHOCO Amendment No.1 Dec-95 0.0
CHOCO Amendment No.2 Dec-96 1.1






PUTUMAYO Amendment No.1 Dec-96 1.0
PUTUMAYO Amendment No.2 Dec-97 1.1
PUTUMAYO Amendment No.3 Jul-98 2.3
PUTUMAYO TOTAL 7.8
TOTAL 3 CASES 21.2
Source: PA and authors calculations.  
 
Chocó.  The department complied with most of the conditions imposed in the first PA
24 
on the revenue side but not on expenditure reduction. The removal of personnel was timid, the 
salaries of the departmental assembly members kept rising and the budget that was approved 
implied only a 30 percent reduction in expenditures, despite the fact that the PA asked for a 
  29reduction of 60 percent. The figure is high, but not excessive, given the very irresponsible 
behavior of the department at the time. Wages paid to deputies were larger than in most other 
regions in the country, and the number of pensioners kept rising through time. The magnitude of 
the adjustment required today in other departments (e.g., Valle Department, in Section 1.A.4) is 
relatively similar. 
The second PA was designed to finance personnel reduction but the accumulation of 
obligations with employees and retired personnel, the weakening (once again) of the tax base and 
legal problems, caused a critical situation. Again, the third loan mentioned the reduction of 
personnel and the rationalization of expenditures. 
Nariño. The reduction of personnel attained after signing the first PA was aggressive, 
very expensive (due to the existence of an onerous labor contract) and insufficient for the 
financial constraints involved. Tax revenue declined in real terms, the burden of retirees and 
teachers kept draining limited resources, and the level of indebtedness almost doubled between 
1996 and 1997. 
Putumayo.  Although important reductions in personnel took place and there was 
compliance with the tax goals set in the PA, the obligations with retirees, wage increases, and 
higher costs at the Departmental Assembly and the Department’s fiscal control office 
(Contraloría), new legal demands and a reduction in royalties, did not permit a healthy financial 
situation. The second and third loans were directed at further reducing personnel, at limiting 
wage increases and special privileges for assembly members, the Governor and upper level 
managers. 
The PAs signed with Chocó, Nariño and Putumayo have not worked as expected. Debt 
has increased and the financial situation has worsened, despite some personnel reductions 
personnel and tax increases. In fact, the CG has often been forced to commit additional resources 
to these TEs after the PAs have been signed. Table 9 shows that the CG signed two additional 
PAs with Chocó (for a total of US$ 7.9 million), one with Nariño (for US$ 5.5 million) and three 
with Putumayo (for a total of US$ 7.8 million).  All told, the CG provided $21.2 million in 1995-
98 to three departments that are currently continuing to face an extremely difficult financial 
situation. 
                                                                                                                                          
24 Revision and verification of the payable accounts and legal procedures against the Department, refinancing of 
debt, compliance with measures designed to increase own revenues, and administrative restructuring. 
  30The critical situation in Chocó resulted from a combination of weak growth in current 
revenue—as a result of a sharp decrease in tax income, not compensated by increases in transfers 
from the CG—and a rapid increase in debt service and operating expenditures.  Between 1992 
and 1994 Nariño’s current expenditures were greater than its revenues (i.e., negative current 
savings). Fiscal deficits and debt rollover became the norm, and the department was forced to 
obtain new loans in order to pay its employees.  In 1995 Putumayo had a very large fiscal deficit 
(the current deficit represented almost 40 percent of current income, and the total deficit 23 
percent of total income), mainly as a result of a sharp reduction in royalties. By contrast, there 
was a significant increase in operating expenditure (due to a large number of new employees) 
and in interest payments. 
There is a special division in the Ministry of Finance (DAF, for División de Apoyo Fiscal 
or Fiscal Support Division)
25 to deal with TEs and with the signing of PAs but the control and 
evaluation of PAs has been extremely complicated, disorganized and inefficient. There has been 
widespread fiscal indiscipline at the regional level and the TE may even be providing untimely 
and unreliable information as a strategic behavior to drive a bailout.
26  The DAF was supposed to 
follow and execute loans, but it was never given wide supervision and control powers. It could 
also be a bad idea to have the DAF inside the Ministry of Finances, both “controlling” and giving 
the money to the TEs. 
The conditions imposed by the PA’s were weak, implied no real penalty in case of lack of 
compliance, and the financial situation of the three departments continues to be critical. PAs 
were used to circumvent short run liquidity problems without solving structural imbalances. It is 
politically difficult and costly to lay off a large number of employees, particularly when the 
regional Assemblies are weak, when compensation costs and the probability of future legal 
demands are high. Restructuring loans has become pervasive, perverse incentives are being 
created, and a “bailout” situation has emerged.  A moral hazard situation has clearly developed 
and the CG is always expected to grant further bailouts.   
                                             
25 Another division at the MoF (Public Credit, División de Crédito Público) also deals with TEs and PAs. 
26 We could not easily collect the information needed and total reliability is not always guaranteed. The information 
is not totally reliable since there is almost no systematic program of inspection and collection (BID, 1998; see also 
Section 1.D. above). Some regions can partially manipulate information for their own benefit and remain in the 
yellow light (see Section I.D.2). The information on flows is much more reliable than the information on stocks, and 
few regions include pension liabilities in their calculations of debt.  It is easy to get information on an individual PA 
  312.  The PASFFIET and other PAs 
 
The financial situation of territorial entities was in deficit but seemed sustainable until 1995, with 
TEs being able to cover their operational expenditures and generate some savings and 
investment. Things began to deteriorate at a rapid pace after 1996, however, especially for the 
departments, with lower savings and increasing debt financing larger investments. The situation 
became critical in 1997, as most departments started to show negative current savings to rely on 
loans to pay wages, other general expenditure and interests, and to delay payments to employees, 
contractors and retirees.    
The causes of the recent crisis are both exogenous and endogenous (Ministerio de 
Hacienda, 1999a). The exogenous factors are lower aggregate growth (and consequently lower 
current revenue for the CG and lower transfers to the TEs), extremely high interest rates,
27 and 
the inelastic nature of tax revenue at the departmental level. The endogenous factors include 
inefficient and inadequate tax administration (no classification of taxpayers, no follow-up of 
their accounts and lack of systematization); large increases in operating expenditures; a 
mismatch between employees’ skills and their functions; lack of discipline in bureaucratic 
assemblies and control offices; a very complex problem with retirees; and unsustainable levels of 
debt. 
The PAs were originally designed to control TE’s debt, without too much involvement by 
the CG, but this only happened in the case of the Valle’s agreement (Section 1.A.4). The CG has 
become the main sponsor of the program in the other cases, helping in the design of the PA and 
its conditions, weakening the restrictions imposed by the PASFFIET on the financial institutions, 
and serving as guarantor to PASFFIET’s credits. The scope of the CG became larger once new 
fiscal and administrative conditions were established to regain access to credit. Some new loans 
have been directed to finance personnel laid-offs, administration and financial restructuring.
28 
There are two clearly defined sources for funding the performance agreements: those 
coming from the PASFFIET, and those coming directly from the national budget. However, 
there is a third, very irregular source, the short-term créditos de tesorería: supposedly they 
                                                                                                                                          
but it is difficult to obtain the consolidated information for Colombia, and not much information is available in 
magnetic files.  
27 Real interest rates jumped from 3 percent to 19 percent between January and December, 1998, the largest in Latin 
America after Brazil. 
  32should be repaid during the fiscal period, but they soon became long-term debt.
29 Table A.2 
shows the composition of the credits approved in the period 1997-1999 and the corresponding 
type of financing.  
Regions in financial trouble preferred new money through a PA or from Dirección de 
Crédito Público because PASFFIET’s loans came under stricter conditions from the international 
agencies supporting the program, and the devaluation risk had to be assumed by the TEs. They 
also knew that a bailout was a real possibility under a PA but not under the PASSFIET. Some 
regions used the PASSFIET at the beginning but ended up signing a PA when they could not 
fulfill their obligations, and some small regions like Chocó simply did not have the 
administrative capacity to use the PASSFIET.  
As of February 1999, 15 out of 32 departments have received loans from the CG (US$ 
115.7 million) under the PASFFIET or under other mechanisms, directed towards the 
restructuring of their administrative, financial and fiscal structure. Under the PASFFIET 
umbrella, eight departments have signed PAs, while the other seven have signed them with the 
Dirección de Crédito Público of the MoF.
30  There were 13 additional requests in the CG’s 
waiting list. 
Table 10 provides information on the departments that have signed PAs. The “need” for 
additional financial resources increased dramatically in 1997 and 1998, and the CG provided 
almost US$100 million to 12 departments. The relative size of the loans varied significantly, 
from a minimum of 2.7 percent of current income in the case of Meta to 70.7 percent in Guajira. 
Out of the 15 departments that have received a “bailout” from the CG, five—Chocó, Cauca, 
Guajira, Nariño and Putumayo—have signed more than one PA, basically because the initial 
loans did not improve the financial situation. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
28 It is important to stress that the vast majority of resources are directed towards the financing of the retirement of 
personnel.  The technical assistance component is very small. 
29 Short-term credits can be converted into long term in Law 488 of 1998. 
30 Caquetá, Bolívar, Huila, Cauca, Cesar, Magdalena, Meta and Norte de Santander.  
  33Table 10. Indicators for Chocó, Nariño and Putumayo 
 
DEPARTMENT 1995 1996 1997 1998 TOTAL U$ PA/CURRENT REV
ATLÁNTICO 5,565 5,565 5.70%
BOLÍVAR 6,193 6,193 19.80%
CAQUETÁ 4,638 4,638 58.20%
CAUCA 12,310 12,310 27.00%
CESAR 3,782 3,782 25.20%
CHOCÓ 3,288 1,061 3,505 7,854 57.70%
GUAJIRA 5,875 5,875 70.70%
HUILA 12,741 12,741 46.10%
MAGDALENA 6,846 6,846 43.40%
META 1,314 1,314 2.70%
NARIÑO 3,134 2,384 5,518 11.80%
NORTE DE SANTANDER 1,929 1,929 8.10%
PUTUMAYO 3,507 965 1,052 2,314 7,838 31.50%
TOLIMA 8,796 8,796 10.20%
VALLE DEL CAUCA 24,537 24,537 7.50%
TOTAL 115,736 14.15%
Source: Own calculations based on PA from DAF and Crédito Público, MoF.  
 
Conditions have not changed much in 1995-98: 13 out of 15 cases considered in Table A. 
3 presented deficits when the agreements were signed; 14 reported accelerating expenditures (11 
with large increases in personnel costs); and 11 mentioned insufficient revenues. Twelve 
departments reported large debts and debt service. Reduction of CG transfers and royalties were 
mentioned as causes of the crises.  
In addition, the treasury “lent” short-term money to the Departments  (and to some 
municipalities) to be repaid during the same fiscal year, but it was not, and the amount of money 
involved increased. The very “unorthodox” Law 488 of 1999 allowed short-term loans to be 
converted into long-term loans guaranteed by the central government and bailouts surged. The 
only requirement was to sign a PA, but the next section will show that PAs did not discipline the 
TEs.  
 
3.  Did PAs Work? 
 
Was the CG able to discipline the regions with the conditions imposed in the PAs? The 
preliminary information suggests otherwise (as noted above and in Table A. 3) but this central 
issue clearly merits further exploration. Table 11 shows the evolution of three proxies of fiscal 
discipline for the group of departments that signed PAs in 1995, 1996 or 1997 (with information 
considered for 1993-98).  
The median value of taxes/(taxes+transfers) in column (1) was 0.71 before 1995 (1994 
and 1995), and 0.33 after 1995 (1996-1998). Fiscal effort decreased since the relation between 
those two numbers is 0.46 in column (3). The table also indicates that the two medians are 
  34statistically different at the 1 percent level of significance.
31 Similar reductions are shown for 
those PAs signed up to 1996 and up to 1997. The results for the other two variables show that 




Table 11. Impact of PAs on Fiscal Discipline, 1993-1998 
(median after the PA/median before the PA) 
 
PAs signed on:
Before After Relation Before After Relation Before After Relation
( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )( 5 )( 6 ) ( 7 )( 8 )
(2)/(1) (4)/(3) (5)/(6)
# of Pas signed 3 5 11
Taxes/(Taxes+Transfers) 0.71 0.33 0.46 0.63 0.31 0.49 0.64 0.10 0.15
(19.06)*** (3.30)** (9.96)***
Expenditure/(Taxes+Transfers) 1.39 1.50 1.08 2.27 3.00 1.32 1.98 2.00 1.01
(1.54) (-0.21) (-0.38)
Expenditure/(Taxes+Transfers+Royalties) 1.39 1.00 0.72 1.41 1.00 0.71 1.34 1.00 0.75
(4.07*) (-0.48) (-0.50)
Statistics in parenthesis correspond to t values for the difference of means; ***: significant at 1% level; **:5%; *: 10% level
1995 (3): Chocó, Nariño and Putumayo; 1996 (4): Choco, La Guajira, Norte de Santander, Putumayo; 1997 (7): Atlántico, Caqueta, Cesar, Meta, Putumayo,





The results of the previous section only considered those departments that signed PAs, 
but the trends observed could have been common to all departments (with and without PAs). 
Table 12 compares the behavior of departments signing PAs with “non-Pas.”
33  The results 
confirm our previous conclusions, since departments with PAs behaved worse than those without 
PAs: taxes decreased more in the three years considered, and expenditures increased more in 
1996 and 1997.
34 
On the whole, a perverse story seems to emerge. Transfers from the central government 
created structural expenditure pressures, and irresponsible behavior in terms of debt (mainly 
loans from the banks) brought the departments into default and forced the central government to 
bail them out. Not only that, but, more importantly, the PAs did not work. On the contrary, taxes 
decreased and expenditures did not fall in relative terms. The empirical results of this section 
confirm our previous intuition of important deficiencies in the PA’s program: they were 
                                             
31 Formally, the test is for the difference between the two means. 
32 We obtained similar results when comparing those departments signing the PA in that year (instead of up to that 
year) with those not signing it.  
33 Numbers for PAs are close (relations between averages instead of medians) to those of columns (3), (6) and (9) of 
the previous Table. 
  35implemented ad-hoc, and the rules of the game were not changed for the newcomers. The 
program increased its size and scope without the required modifications.  
 
Table 12. Impact of Performance Agreements, PAs vs. No PAs 
(average after/average before) 
Pas No Pas Pas No Pas Pas No Pas
T a x e s / ( T a x e s + T r a n s f e r s ) 0 . 4 80 . 7 10 . 5 60 . 6 00 . 2 30 .
E x p e n d i t u r e / ( T a x e s + T r a n s f e r s ) 0 . 7 11 . 0 01 . 2 20 . 9 81 . 1 30 .
Expenditure/(Taxes+Transfers+Royalties) 0.72 1.05 1.24 1.04 1.15 0.92







4.  The Case of the Department of Valle 
 
Valle, the most indebted department, signed a PA with the Nation in December 1997 as a 
previous step before getting new loans. The new obligations were not fulfilled, however, and a 
new PA was signed with the banks in September 1998, without too much government 
involvement. This makes it a special case because the 23 financial institutions involved (eight of 
them accounting for 70 percent of total debt), and not the CG, imposed the obligations. The 
agreement’s aim was to refinance debt with the financial system, reduce the level of 
indebtedness to sustainable levels, and recover the financial viability of the Department.  
It is important to describe the conditions imposed by the financial institutions to Valle, 
and compare them with the other agreements involving the Nation:  
•  Valle was forced to contract an irrevocable trust deposit with a fiduciary society that will 
administer the resources involved. The society will transfer to the Department resources to 
pay personnel and other general expenditures, and the other responsibilities in force by the 
date of the agreement. The fiduciary will expeditiously cancel the debt service. 
•  The Department was forced to contract an irrevocable trust deposit with a fiduciary 
society, which will value, administer and sell shares owned by the Department in the areas of 
energy and ports.
35 
                                                                                                                                          
34 More research is needed in this area, however, since the poor record of the regions signing PAs could be 
associated with poor growth in the following years, or with other exogenous variables that hit taxes. 
35 The Empresa de Energía del Pacífico S.A. (EPSA) and in the Sociedad Portuaria Regional de Buenaventura, S.A. 
If the product of the sale of the shares to be given to the financial institutions is lower than col $120 billion, the 
Department is forced to provide alternatives to complete this amount and be able to credit it to the debt balance.  
  36•  Before signing the PA the Department needed an authorization to reprogram and 
refinance short-term loans, and to increase its level of debt, to pay interests overdue, short-
term credits, and the interests generated in the period.  
•  Personnel and other current expenditures not covered by the Situado Fiscal
36 should be 
cut by at least 5 percent in real terms during 1999 and 2000. The (mandatory) increments in 
current revenue should be firstly directed to honor the debt service.  The department can 
freely allocate 50 percent of the additional revenue only when the annual real increments are 
larger than 2.5 percent.  
 
In general terms, this PA improves the debt profile: the amortization period increases and 
the interest rates decrease.  Should one of the non-fulfillment clauses occur, the financial 
institutions can declare the total amount of the debt, the restructured debt, the interests and other 
obligations as under non-fulfillment and therefore as immediately due.  
It is still difficult to predict the final outcome of the agreement, but the preliminary 
evidence is not very encouraging. The department has barely fulfilled its obligations, and has not 
been able to show a good record in terms of taxes. Thus, as shown in Figure 5, the participation 
of Valle in total departmental taxes remained relatively constant in 1990-94 but has been falling 
since that year. The pattern observed for Valle is much worse than for Antioquia or 
Cundinamarca, the other two large departments in Colombia. The preliminary evidence on 
current expenditures is not encouraging, either. 
  
                                             
36 Expenditures cannot grow in real terms after year 2001. 
  37Figure 5. Valle, Cundinamarca and Antioquia  














































5.  Conclusions on the Disciplining Effects of PAs 
 
Despite the fact that the indebtedness law specifies that the agreements should be signed with 
financial institutions, the Ministry of Finance has actively pursued the signing of agreements 
with the nation. Under this scheme, the nation diminishes the responsibilities of the financial 
sector. In the words of the Contraloría General de la República (1997, p. 112) “Law 358 and the 
performance agreements are instruments that continue with the paternalistic tradition of helping 
bad administrators of local finances.”  
Only the Department of Valle has signed an agreement directly with its debtors, which 
differs radically from those signed with the Nation, the basic criteria behind it being the 
recuperation of loans by the financial institutions. Issues such as modifying the organizational 
structure of the department, diminishing its personnel plant and other adjustments are implicit in 
the agreement.  
The two main actors—the CG via the Ministry of Finance, and the Departments through 
their National Federation—agree that the indebtedness law has been violated and, therefore, does 
not really act as a restriction. Also, they note that the ratio assessing the liquidity of the TE only 
  38includes payment of interest, excluding amortization, thereby undervaluing the debt service that 
for which the TE is responsible. 
As shown in the last section, PAs did not produce the expected disciplining results and 
the intervention of the CG instead tended to promote misbehavior by the departments. The CG 
was considered a potential source of finance and a good partner in the negotiations with the 
financial sector. In short, the central government clearly bailed out the Colombian regions. The 
mechanism has become perverse: wrong incentives are being created, a moral hazard situation is 
clearly emerging, and a further softening of the TE budget constraint has developed. The PA 
signed with the department of Valle has not shown the expected results either. 
A very perverse history in the area of PAs emerges. The new resources offered by the 
central government (transfers and co-financing) and the banks (debt) allowed the (mainly poor) 
departments to reduce fiscal effort with predictable consequences. The system was originally 
designed in an ad-hoc manner, to solve the problems of 3 or 4 small departments, but no 
important modifications on the rules of the game were introduced when latecomers joined the 
club.  
 
6.  Quantitative Analysis of the Determinants of Type 1 “Bailouts” (Performance 
Agreements) 
 
The characteristics of the tax base, political considerations and institutional arrangements should 
matter when looking at the determinants of bailouts. To start with, bailouts may be less likely 
when local governments have a robust tax base, generate a large part of their revenue (vertical 
balance), have autonomy for modifying the tax base (more flexibility on the tax bases and on 
rates) or when expenditure responsibilities are less widespread. 
The causality is less clear when political considerations are taken into account. Thus, 
bailouts may be larger or more likely when the lower level government belongs to the same 
political party as the higher level government, but it must also be recognized that bailouts could 
be extended in exchange for a favorable vote in Congress from the opposition, and mainly when 
party discipline is weak, when the political system is unstable, when reelection is not allowed, 
and when elections are close. Obviously, bailouts should be more likely when the local crisis can 
be partly traced to actions undertaken by the central government (e.g., education in Colombia, as 
will be discussed below).  
  39Finally, institutional arrangements matter and bailouts could be more likely when the 
Constitution stipulates a mandatory rescue, when there are no debt limits for local entities (as is 
the case in the United States), when there are local banks owned by the states (as in Brazil) and 
when transfers can be used as guarantees.
37  
                                           
This section attempts to include some of these variables in our empirical analysis of the 
determinants of PAs in Colombia. A probit regression analysis is used to predict the probability 
of a department’s signing a PA in 1995-1998. Table 13 considers some of the variables 
potentially relevant in the explanation of the bailouts, classified under 6 categories: vertical 
imbalance and dependence, debt, poverty, political, violence and size.  
Five proxies were used for vertical unbalance and dependence: the three variables 
considered in Table 11, per capita transfers and cofinancing; two proxies for poverty, GDP per 
capita and unsatisfied basic needs; and two proxies for size, GDP and population. For the 
political category a dummy variable was used with a value of 1 when there was a Liberal 
governor in that department in any of the years of the period 1994-1998; and for violence used 
the rate of criminal activities was used. The average of each variable in 1994-98 was used when 
the variables were not dummy variables. 
 
 
37 See IDB (1998). 
  40Table 13. Variables Potentially Relevant in the Determination of a PA 
Type or Variable Variable




  Per capita transfers
  Co-financing Funds per capita
Debt   Debt per capita
Poverty   Per capita GDP
   % of population with unsatisfied basic needs
Political   Political Party of Governor
Violence   Rate of criminal activities per 10000 people
Size   GDP
  Population  
 
Table 14 shows the results of the probit regressions. The coefficients in parentheses 
correspond to the t statistic (white) adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The number of observations 
is 23, since there is no information on some key variables (i.e., GDP per capita) for 9 of them. 
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 when a PA was signed by that department during the 
period 1994-97 and 0 otherwise. 
Column (1) presents the “basic” model and shows that the likelihood of signing a PA 
increases with debt and poverty (GDP per capita), and decreases with fiscal effort 
(taxes/taxes+transfers). A PA is also less likely when the governor of the department belongs to 
the political party of the President (liberal in those years). All the coefficients are significant at 
the 1 percent level, and the R
2 of 0.66 is acceptable for a cross section exercise. The analysis of 
possible outliers (not shown) suggests that the results are relatively consistent for all the 
departments except Chocó, but results are robust to the exclusion of Chocó. 
Columns (2) –(4) consider different indicators of vertical unbalance and dependence. 
Comparison with the basic model suggests that taxes are a better measure of fiscal effort than 
expenditures.
38 Transfers per capita are significant at the 5 percent level and have the correct 
sign, but only when we exclude our “best” index of fiscal effort in the basic model. The inclusion 
                                             
38 We considered Expenditures/(Taxes+Transfers+Royalties), but the results do not change for 
Expenditures/(Taxes+Transfers). 
  41of cofinancing per capita (not shown), unsatisfied basic needs (the second proxy for poverty), 
and the two proxies for size (GDP and population) do not add to the explanatory power of the 
independent variables.  
The results of column (6) suggest that those departments suffering more violence are 
likely to get involved into PAs, though the significance of debt disappears. The R
2 increases to 
0.78 and “violence” could also have been included in the basic model of column (1).
39 
  
Table 14. Determinants of PAs, PROBIT Regressions  
Dependent Variable: PA (1 or 0)
Basic Poverty Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FISCAL EFFORT AND DEPENDENCE
Taxes/(Taxes+Transfers) -15.75 -16.94 -15.42 -22.73 -14.56 -15.65
-(2.68)*** -(3.00)*** -(2.41)*** -(5.06)*** -(2.38)*** -(2.48)***
Expenditures/(Taxes+Transfers+Royalties) -0.89
-(0.99)
Per-Capita Transfers 82.01 -35.82
(1.95)** -(0.74)
DEBT (stock)
Debt per capita 249.95 112.35 219.04 200.51 247.27 79.32 237.02 248.84
(2.19)** (2.42)*** (2.41)*** (1.80)* (2.15)** (1.28) (2.36)*** (2.21)**
WEALTH OR POVERTY
GDP per capita -7.47 -3.75 -7.42 -5.64 -7.41 -5.53 -6.74 -7.43
-(2.42)*** -(3.22)*** -(2.74)*** -(1.56) -(2.42)*** -(3.53)*** -(2.27)*** -(2.46)***
% of Population with Unsatisfied basic needs -1.67E-07
-(0.14)
POLITICAL
Liberal Governor between 1994 and 1998 -4.13 -1.24 -2.21 -3.56 -4.07 -8.99 -4.08 -4.12
-(2.43)*** -(1.80)* -(2.08)** -(2.30)*** -(2.25)*** -(4.42)*** -(2.54)*** -(2.40)***
VIOLENCE






Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
(Pseudo) R2 0.66 0.37 0.50 0.66 0.66 0.78 0.61 0.66
Probit regressions in all cases for 32 departments; averages for 1994-98; White correction for heteroscedasticity in all cases. Numbers in parenthesis
correspond to the (asymptotic) t t ***: 1% level of significance, **: 5%; *: 10%;  results for the constant not reported
Fiscal Effort and dependence Size
 
 
Fortunately, some of the three significant variables can be targeted as policy instruments, 
and can be modified in order to improve the institutional arrangement of decentralization in 
Colombia. Fiscal effort should be promoted and special incentives could be designed to increase 
the collection of higher taxes in the regions. Transfers have increased drastically during the 
1990s, as ordered by the Constitution of 1991, but they are under heavy discussion. Our 
empirical exercise suggests that large transfers distort local finances and increases the probability 
of PAs and trouble, and there are some suggestions on how to rationalize them (Alesina, 
Carrasquilla and Echavarría, 2000).  
                                             
39 Most of our previous results remain when violence is included in the other regressions of the table, with both 
violence and debt remaining significant in some of them.   
  42Cofinancing funds have not worked properly (Coyuntura Económica, 1998) and they 
could represent an alternative form of bailout, a way to provide additional funds to certain 
jurisdictions, which then have less need for PAs. But that variable did not result significant in our 
previous analysis, and the amounts involved are small when compared with other types of 
transfers. 
Debt limits should be implemented. They restrict the amount of (future) resources 
transferred by the CG, promote fiscal discipline, and reduce the probability of bailouts. GDP per 
capita-poverty comes out as a significant variable in our results, and this suggests that special 
policies should be designed for the group of poor departments. They simply do not have the 
infrastructure needed to run a modern and efficient public administration.  
Violence does not only affect growth directly through its impact on investment and 
productivity, but also indirectly through its effect on public policy and administration (Arbeláez, 
Echavarría and Gaviria, 2001). Investing in the reduction of violence is the most important 
economic “project” the country can undertake. No wonder that departments with high indexes of 
violence are also more likely to behave badly and end up signing PAs. 
 
B.  Bailout Type 2: The Educational Compensation Fund (FEC) 
The second type of bailout considered in the paper is related to the provision and financing of 
pre-school, elementary and secondary education in Colombia. The Constitution of 1991 and Law 
60 of 1993 partially regulated the assignment of resources and responsibilities among levels of 
government, and provided the legal framework for education financing. 
 
1.  The Situado Fiscal and the FEC 
 
The Constitution (Article 67) defines education as mandatory for children between 5 and 15 
years of age, covering at least one year of pre-school and nine of basic education (five of 
elementary and four of secondary). The constitutional responsibility of the CG and the TE 
remains vague, however, claiming that education should be free in state institutions, but also that 
those who can pay should do so.  
Article 356 states that the Situado Fiscal should be directed towards financing pre-
school, primary and secondary education, and health services. Law 60 regulated this article, 
defined the Situado as the main instrument for financing education, and established the 
  43percentage of CG’s current income that would be transferred to the departments, the Capital 
District (Bogotá) and four special districts, and the sectoral and regional distribution of the 
resources.   
Out of 290,000 public sector teachers, 220,000 are paid through the Situado. The rest are 
financed through the co-financing system (around 15,000 teachers), municipal participations 
(that were intended to finance infrastructure investment and better quality), own resources, and 
(recently) the Education Compensation Fund (FEC; see Section I.C.3) 
There are several deficiencies in the Assignment of the Educational Resources through 
the Situado: 
•  Confusion. There is no clear definition of responsibilities among levels of government, 
and fragmented functions generate confusion and disorganization.  
•  Inefficiency. There are no incentives for the organizations to operate efficiently (Duarte, 
1997): the departments do not have incentives to rationalize or reduce the number of teachers 
on the payroll, since they perceive that the CG pays for these inefficiencies, and they hire 
teachers under the (correct) assumption that the CG will end up paying their salaries if they 
run out of resources.
40 Soft budget constraints are the best environment for FECODE, the 
national teacher’s union, to operate (see below). 
•  Managerial and administrative problems. Lack of confident and timely information, and 
the politicization of the sector have resulted in continuous and growing demands for 
resources. There is no information on key variables such as the number and type of teachers 
at the national, departmental or municipal level, on the number of students or potential 
children to be covered. 
•  Inequity. The formulae for resource allocation in terms of sectoral distribution 
(education, health and other services) does not take into account the particular needs of 
different regions, generating local excesses or lack of resources in health and/or education.  
 
                                             
40 There is an additional ingredient that increases the pressure faced by the CG. The largest union is the teachers 
union, FECODE. It includes all national teachers and around 220,000 and 70,000 departmental and municipal 
teachers, respectively. When one TE stops payment of wages to the teachers under its responsibility, the union 
announces that the “Government” is not fulfilling its responsibilities.  It calls for a strike, and all public school 
teachers comply. 
  44The formula for the distribution of the Situado for public education is based primarily on 
the number of teachers assigned to each region in 1993. This arrangement, which originally 
motivated regions to accept the new decentralization scheme, helped to perpetuate the 
distortions, inefficiencies and inequities existent in relation to the regional distribution of 
teachers and thus, of education resources (Duarte, 1997). The present model is based on the costs 
of the system, not on results, as there is no assignment on a per capita or per alumni basis. 
 
2.  Some Background on FECODE 
 
Some background on FECODE could be useful. The Colombian Federation of Teachers 
(FECODE) assembles all employees working in public education, at most levels of schooling, 
and has become one of the few labor organizations in Colombia able to exert real pressure on the 
central government. The average period in power of the Minister of Education in Colombia 
during the last decade has been less than one year, and that defines very well who gains in a 
negotiation generally marked by strong confrontation. FECODE’s demands are most of the time 
related to wage increases (the quality of education or related issues generally being absent from 
the negotiations) and results have been impressive.  
In 1995 the government offered col $ 300 billion for the educational sector, 30 percent of 
them related to “incentives,” but after the strike of that year FECODE got col $ 800 billion and 
only 18 percent for “incentives”; most of it went to wage increases. Nominal wages for teachers 
in the public sector have increased 8 percent faster than for the rest of the public sector year after 
year in 1996-98. In 1996 teacher’s wages increased 25 percent, compared to 15.5-19.5 percent 
for public employees; figures for 1997 and 1998 are 21.5 percent vs. 13.5 percent and 24 percent 
vs. 16 percent, respectively.  
In 1997 FECODE and the CG negotiated the construction of five new recreational centers 
in five departments, for the use of educators and their families. These recreational centers, 
together with the real increase of 26 percent in wages, correspond to a program of “incentives to 
educators designed to improve the quality of education.” FECODE still argues that average 
wages for teachers are lower than for other public employees, but that seems to be dubious once 
you adjust for the number of hours worked (Ayala and Hernández, 1998). 
The Constitution of 1991 and Law 60/93 aim towards the decentralization of education, 
but FECODE opposes it. It has systematically opposed wage negotiations at the local level since 
  45that “promotes politicization.” FECODE has also forced the CG to intervene and pay salaries and 
pensions when local authorities do not have the money or the will to do it. 
 
3.  Is the Educational Compensation Fund - FEC a Bailout? 
 
The amount of money going to Situado should be enough to cover all the educational needs 
(Vargas and Sarmiento, 1997) but, for reasons explained below, the CG created the Educational 
Compensation Fund (FEC), designed to compensate for the “deficits in the Situado.”  
The FEC was created to finance additional wages
41 negotiated in 1995 between the CG 
and the national teacher’s union (FECODE) for all teachers in the country, but new goals have 
been added later on, such as the financial backing for teachers paid by departments and 
municipalities,
42 and the attention to families and teachers displaced by poverty and violence in 
rural areas.  The FEC also incorporated some of the additional money needed to finance those 
expenditures described in the previous section. 
FECODE is a powerful union in the country, and the size and importance of FEC has 
increased dramatically, from 7.5 percent of Situado in 1996 to 32 percent in 1998. The Situado 
and FEC amounted to 30 percent of CG’s current income in 1998, and to 0.7 percent of GDP in 
1999 (Table A.1). The amount involved in the FEC represented close to 30 percent of the 
Situado Fiscal. 
The Planning Office (Planeación Nacional) determines the global amount of the FEC, 
and the Ministry of Education produces the detailed figures for the different regions after intense 
negotiations. The Ministry of Finance can always modify the “final” numbers. Those regions that 
“modernized” their administration of the educational system did not have to pay this credit back. 
 
                                             
41 Due to wage increases, the promotion of teachers in the salary scale, and the incorporation to the National payroll 
of co-financed teachers (MoF, 1998). In 1995 the National Government and FECODE agreed to an additional 
increase in salaries for teachers and managers in the public education system, with respect to the raise given to the 
rest of the public officials. 
42 A share of it correspond to the agreements reached at the negotiation table in 1996 when organized peasants 
marched in the Departments of  Putumayo, Caquetá, Cauca, Guaviare, Bolivar, Santander, Meta and Nariño.  
  46Table 15. Situado Fiscal and Educational Compensation Fund 
(Millions of dollars unless otherwise stated) 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998
Situado Fiscal 2,004 2,348 2,459 2,248
Situado Fiscal for Education 1,706 1,751 1,597
Educational Compensation Fund (ECF) 128 317 507
Situado Fiscal for Education + ECF 1,834 2,067 2,104
Current Revenues * 8,526 9,583 10,036 9,176
Situado Fiscal / Current Revenues 23.5% 24.5% 24.5% 24.5%
Situado Fiscal + ECF / Current Revenues 25.8% 27.7% 30.0%
ECF as a percentage of Situado Fiscal  5.5% 12.9% 22.5%
ECF as a percentage of Situado Fiscal for Education 7.5% 18.1% 31.7%
* Calculated by applying the participation (by law) of the Situado in the current revenue
Source: NPD and M o F, Author's calculation  
 
The definition of the portion of FEC that constitutes a bailout is a tricky question, one 
that clearly reveals the problems of lack of accountability, confusion of responsibilities, 
existence of unreliable information and of perverse incentives. Basically, even if the CG knows 
that the contract for the provision and financing of education services that was established with 
the TE has been breached, it could be unable to monitor and evaluate the TE behavior because 
the contract is incomplete.  
It is not a bailout to give additional money to the regions in order to compensate for wage 
increases agreed upon at the national level between the CG and FECODE (part of the true story), 
but a clear bailout arises when the regions appoint new teachers (not having the resources 
needed) trusting that the CG will provide the additional money in the future, once the political 
situation is out of control. The analogy to the issues posed by Wildasin (1997) is clear:  
•  There is a contract that has been established between the Principal (CG) and the agent 
(department) for the provision and financing of education services at the school level. The 
Situado has been defined as the mechanism through which the CG guarantees a level of 
education that it considers to be correct, and Law 60 provides the legal mechanisms though 
which the Situado should be assigned.  
•  In a second step, the TE makes decisions in terms of resource generation and expenditure 
(patterns and levels). Despite the existence of a contract with the CG, the department decides 
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contract occurs.  
•  In the third step the CG steps in, and validates through FEC the local decisions. The 
budget constraint is no longer binding and a “bailout” has occurred.  
 
4.  Econometric Determinants of Type 2 “Bailouts” (Educational Compensation Fund, 
FEC) 
 
The regressions in Table 16 considered the amount of FEC transferred to each department as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are the growth rate in 1996-98 for the number of 
teachers appointed at the local level (i.e., paid by the departments and municipalities) and 
teachers appointed (and paid) at the national level.
43 Also included are the Situado Fiscal for 
education, the student/teacher ratio, the existence or absence of PAs in that department (1 or 0), a 
dummy for Liberal governor in that department and period, and the number of senators.  
To include the expansion of teachers appointed at each level seems appropriate for the 
analysis since the goal is to detect signs of “misbehavior” at the local level: did the FEC increase 
because the regional authorities were appointing teachers, and the central government just 
validated such behavior ex-post? This could be a clear sign of bailout. To compare trends, those 
teachers appointed at the central level are also included. 
It also seems appropriate to include the Situado for education in the regressions since 
FEC could just be an extension, a result of bad planning when the education program started 
(i.e., Situado funds were not enough). That could hardly be called a bailout from the CG.  But no 
other variable should prove significant if this is the case, an empirical issue considered below.
44 
The inclusion of PAs is obvious, with those departments that misbehaved at a general level 
(Bailout Type 1) being good candidates for misbehavior in the area of education expenditures. 
The student/teacher ratio is also included as a good proxy for effort, efficiency and discipline in 
this area.  
The first column shows a significant and positive relation between FEC in education and 
Situado Fiscal, a relation that remains in the other regressions of the table. This means that 
                                             
43 Thanks are due to Fabio Sánchez for providing this valuable (but not official) information.  
44 In any event, what is the logic of giving money to the regions for education, under different criteria? Are the 
allocation parameters of Situado wrong? 
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FEC, which in turn suggests that there was indeed an element of initial bad planning.  
But this is not the end of the story, since other variables turn out to be significant. Thus, 
there is a positive and highly significant relation between FEC and (the growth rate of) teachers 
appointed by departments and municipalities, and a negative and significant relation with the 
number of teachers appointed at the central level. This suggests that local authorities appointed 
teachers with their resources and got additional funds from FEC later on.
45 Finally, the results 
show that Liberal governors got more money from FEC than their Conservative friends in other 
departments. The student/teacher ratio does not have a large explanatory power (it is significant 
in half of the regressions, and only at the 10 percent level). PAs and the number of senators per 
department prove even less important. 
  
                                             
45 It is known that regions that quickly increased the number of teachers appointed with their own resources also 
received large amounts of FEC later on, and this suggests the kind of story that this section attempts to document.  
Unfortunately, information is available only on the number of teachers for 1996 and 1998, which is insufficient for a 
detailed analysis of lags. 




Growth rate of the number of 
teachers appointed (and paid) by 
departments and municipalities 102.18 78.32 78.50 102.57 78.72 79.45
(2.41***) (1.96**) (1.93**) (2.44***) (1.88**) (1.90**)
Growth rate of the number of 
teachers appointed (and paid) by 
the central government -322.79 -196.16 -195.46 -321.33 -264.02 -265.67
(-2.44***) (-1.28) (-1.29) (-2.41***) (-1.76**) (-1.93**)
Situado Fiscal for Education 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(4.60***) (4.31***) (4.97***) (5.17***) (4.47***) (5.91***) (3.40***)
Student/Teachers -308.76 -308.82 -221.38 -222.20
(-1.71*) (-1.72*) (-1.20) (-1.19)
PAs (0, 1) 112.33 241.10 1035.53 1062.95
(0.05) (0.11) (0.54) (0.51
Liberal Governor (0, 1) 11531.66 11534.92
(3.27***) (3.19***)
Senators per Deparment 41.92
(0.05
Observations 81 69 69 69 69 69 69
R
2 0.61 0.72 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.77 0.77
Regression for a panel data with i: 32 departments; t: 1994-98; White correction for heteroscedasticity.
Numbers inparenthesis correspond to the (asymptotic) t statistic: *: 1% level of significance, **: 5%; ***:




C.  Bailout Type 3: Medellin’s Metro Rail System 
  
The third type of bailout examined is the construction of the Metro of Medellin. When the 
decision was made to build Medellin’s Metro system, there existed numerous institutional 
mechanisms at the regional and national level to ensure that only profitable projects were 
implemented. These mechanisms notwithstanding unfavorable feasibility studies were 
disregarded, Ministers of Finance were pressured, a deceptive media campaign was carried out 
and laws were amended whenever needed.  Medellin’s Metro Rail system has produced a highly 
negative internal rate of return. Demand has been three times lower than originally estimated, 
  50total cost three times higher,
46 and the benefits in terms of traffic reduction questionable.
47 
Ultimately, the CG had to assume a considerable portion of the cost of the Metro. 
It was agreed from the beginning that the project should be financed with foreign 
resources, and the international private banks always conditioned their involvement on the 
procurement of a guarantee from the CG. This guarantee in turn depended on a favorable concept 
from the planning office (DNP) and approval by the National Council on Economic and Social 
Policy (CONPES).  
The first enterprise created by the municipal government of Medellin to review the train 
issue—Metropolitana del Aburrá—concluded in 1968 that the project was not feasible. Its 
manager submitted a report that expressed several major reservations. First, Medellin does not 
and will not have sufficient population to make a train system feasible. Second, most of the city’s 
inhabitants live on the mountainside, which is inaccessible by train. Third, more suitable 
alternatives for mass transportation existed. 
After creating a new enterprise—the Empresa de Transporte Masivo del Valle de Aburrá, 
ETMVA
48—commissioning several deficient studies,
49 and overcoming multiple obstacles at the 
municipal level, a foreign indebtedness application for $263 million was submitted to DNP and 
to the Ministry of Finance in 1979.  It was not approved. 
In September 1981, ETMVA submitted a new study to the DNP, with an Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) of 22 percent.  Following several corrections, DNP obtained an IRR of 8.4 percent 
(DNP, 1982a). A year later, EMTVA submitted a new indebtedness application, this time for 
$656 million.  DNP proposed two alternatives: a) the project design should be concluded before 
being submitted again; or b) the contract should be started without final designs, with CONPES 
giving its opinion when the designs were completed.  
                                             
46 Pachón (1991, pp. 53-54) finds an internal rate of return of -1.7 percent, assuming a demand of 900,000 
passengers per day (ppd).   In 1981 the DNP had put demand at 300,000 ppd. The actual figure for 1998 was 
281,000 ppd.  
47 It is worth noting that the Avenida Caracas Trunk Road Project, in Bogota, a transportation system with buses, 
mobilizes twice the amount of passengers, at a cost one hundred times less than the Medellin train.  
48 Incorporated as a partnership between the Municipality of Medellin and the Department of Antioquia.  In those 
years the President of the Republic appointed the highest local authorities (Mayor and Governor). From 1986, the 
mayors are elected by popular vote. The same would apply to Governors from 1991. 
49 The main criticisms formulated by the DNP had to do with cost underestimation and demand overestimation, by a 
ratio of 20 to 1.  
  51The technical team of DNP proposed “indebtedness procedures authorized on the 
assumption that the bidding forms will allow for competition of the bidders without a guarantee 
from the Nation” (DNP, 1982b, p. 39), and the Director of DNP considered that “all the studies 
carried out led to believe that, even under the most negative assumptions, the investment is 
profitable” (CONPES, 1982).
50 The President congratulated DNP for the study and emphasized 
that “the project was essential to restore Medellin’s lost dynamism and to open new horizons, to 
regain the leadership of Antioquia it had traditionally exercised” (CONPES, 1982). 
CONPES granted the Nation’s guarantee, although the DNP study explicitly denied its 
feasibility. This guarantee implied that the Nation would be liable for the project in the event that 
ETMVA was unable to meet its obligations. In case the guarantee was made effective, the Nation 
should eventually recover the funds by making effective counter-guarantees with the 
Municipality of Medellin and the Department of Antioquia.  
On January 14, 1982 the Minister of Finance received the indebtedness application and a 
few days later granted the guarantee, without requiring the corresponding counter-guarantees 
from Medellin and Antioquia, that is, without committing the region to pledge any funds. The 
CGR believed that there was lack of diligence on the part of the Ministry of Finance, since it was 
aware of the fragility of the project (CGR, 1994, Introduction). 
Conservative President Betancur was originally from Antioquia, a traditionally 
Conservative region that played a crucial role in his election. The Conservative party had been a 
minority for years, but the Liberal party was divided and this helped him to finally win his fourth 
presidential campaign. Contrary to the moderate distance he kept in the previous campaign on 
this issue, Betancur now fully endorsed Medellin’s metro. The arguments were based more on 
the (very doubtful) positive externalities than on transportation benefits for citizens. Instead of 
considering technical arguments, Betancur viewed the Metro as an instrument for the city’s 
recovery and return to its role as the leading city of Antioquia.  
Antioquia has always been an important region, economically and politically. It accounts 
for about 15 percent of the national GDP, produces a significant portion of the coffee harvest, 
and has the second largest manufacturing sector in the country. Like the country as a whole, 
                                             
50  Officials attending the meeting included, among others: the President of the Republic; the Ministers of Finance 
(who abandoned the room as soon as the discussion on the Train began), Foreign Relations, Development, 
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percent and 6 percent, respectively. Unemployment jumped to 14 percent in Medellin in 1982, 
and to 17 percent in 1983. Ex post, it is evident that building the Metropolitan Train was not a 
solution to the region’s serious problems, and the construction of the train only generated 2,500 
direct jobs and approximately 7,500 indirect ones—between 1 and 1.5 percent of Medellins total 
employment.
51 
Once CONPES approved the project, Spanish entrepreneurs pressured their government 
to obtain the contract,
52 and the construction contract was awarded to the Spanish-German 
consortium METROMED in October of 1983, with financing by a syndicate of Spanish and 
German banks. The cost of the project on the part of the ETMVA and METROMED was not 
established in the contract, which in practical terms meant the signing of a “blank check.” 
The Minister of Finance demanded regional counter-guarantees in August of 1984 since 
the project had a regional scope. But Jorge Valencia (then Senator for Antioquia) defined the line 
that would become the strategic behavior of the region, anticipating the conception of Law 310 
of 1996 (see below). According to Valencia, the counter-guarantee should simply be considered 
“a declaration of good intentions” that must not be executed for the full amount of the project. 
Additionally, the pledge of departmental and/or municipal income will not be effected because 
sooner or later “the Nation [will support] cities in projects such as this one” (El Colombiano, 
October 11, 1984).  
In November 1984, the Departmental Assembly and the Municipal Council extended the 
counter-guarantees, but the Minister of Finance took some time to approve them. For the local 
press “the people anxiously await the works and international institutions are running out of 
patience... If the President has committed himself with such an important project, his Minister 
                                                                                                                                          
Agriculture and Public Works and Transportation; the Governor of the Central Bank; the Manager of the National 
Coffee Growers Federation; the Head of the DNP; the President of ECOPETROL and the Mayor of Medellin. 
51 This amount of jobs is 20 times smaller than the variance of the quarterly employment series. In a regression to 
explain employment, a dummy for the metro rail system was not significant. Estimates are available from the 
authors.  
52 According to Madrid’s newspaper El País (October 10, 1983) “the visit that the President of Colombia (and 
former ambassador to Spain), began on Friday the 7th, will be used by the Spanish administration to try to have 
construction of the Medellin Metro Rail system awarded to one of the Spanish consortiums that are competing for it 
[...] The Colombian Minister of Economic Development stated that Spain is very likely to be awarded the project 
[...] since not only will financing conditions be considered, but also the circumstances in which bilateral relations are 
being conducted” (Alvear, 1990, pp. 30-31). 
  53must act in accordance” (El Colombiano, cited by Acevedo, Salazar and Castañeda, 1993, pp. 
76-77). 
The construction of the train started to fall behind schedule and costs increased, but the 
consortium cited the devaluation of the peso and problems with import licenses that had to be 
granted by Incomex (the CG agency in charge of regulating foreign trade). Those justifications 
did not seem entirely reasonable.  The exchange rate adjustment was foreseeable given the 
balance of payments situation of the country, and devaluation had been mentioned by the 
Ministry of Finance as an argument against the project’s feasibility. In fact, ten years later the 
CG transferred resources to the project to assume the financial burden generated by devaluation. 
The consortium’s reference to import licenses also seemed unfounded. In the contract it had been 
specified that import costs would be borne by METROMED, which had stated that it was 
familiar with legal regulations on the matter. 
The project was virtually bankrupt at the end of the 1980s, and ETMVA was using 
working capital to pay interest. The Nation, at that time involved in improving the profile of its 
foreign debt, began facing major problems abroad. Following the depletion of foreign credit, the 
CG was forced to assume the obligations of the project, as ETMVA had barely received 
previously agreed contributions from the municipality and the department. 
On July 1989 the Spanish Prime Minister requested President Barco (1986-1990) “to 
ensure the continuity and final completion of the project” (CGR, 1994, p. 308), and in March 
1989, the Colombian government and the banks held a meeting and entered into the Madrid 
Protocol, aimed at refinancing the project. The banks conditioned their approval on new 
guarantees by Colombia. In December 1989, the national government enacted the “Metropolitan 
Train Law” (Law 86) aimed at creating a national and municipal tax infrastructure to allow for 
the financing of mass transportation projects, particularly Medellin’s Metro Rail system.   
Additionally, the Nation’s commitment to restructuring the debt of the Medellin Metro 
(the $656 million of 1984) was conditioned on a counter-guarantee, backed by a pledge of local 
income from a 10 percent surcharge on gasoline and a property appreciation tax that the region 
committed itself to collect. The law authorized the Nation to contract or guarantee foreign credits 
for an additional $500 million, destined for public transportation systems. To grant the guarantee 
it was established (Art. 4) that at least 80 percent of the debt service had to be pledged, but this 
requirement was never met. 
  54The position of the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) was apparently more responsible. 
His Minister of Finance stated, “we are willing to help Antioquia, but this is a regional problem 
and no Minister of Finance can extend a $2 billion guarantee without the certainty that the 
money can be recovered.”  In what later became known as the Medellin Protocol, the 
Government agreed with the regional authorities
53 that if works were completed by September, 
1994, the total cost of the project would amount to $1.9 billion, of which $1.2 billion was 
financed.  
The remaining $726 million would be covered by  $500 million with a new foreign credit 
guaranteed by the Nation and $226 million with domestic resources. The Nation committed itself 
to procure the new guarantees before the CONPES and to obtain the credits. The ETMVA 
promised to settle the situation with METROMED and, jointly with the Mayor’s Office and the 
Department, to pledge resources and deliver assets, whenever necessary. 
The Nation has continued to service the train’s foreign debt. The region has once again 
defaulted on payments—except for the pledge of income on which a contractual commitment 
was required in order to meet the first tranche of $650 million. The collection of the property 
appreciation tax was suspended and the Department ceased delivering the taxes on tobacco. 
Currently, only the gasoline surcharge—collected directly by the CG—is being pledged.
54 
 
                                           
The largest transfer from the CG to the Medellin Train (and probably the most significant 
strategic mistake) took place with the enactment of Law 310 of 1996, which set forth that the 
Nation would pay 40 percent of the net present value of the debt of the Medellin Train and up to 
70 percent of that for other trains to be built.   
 
D.  What Did We Learn? Some Recommendations for the Future 
 
Before finishing, it could be useful to speculate on some potential improvements designed to 
avoid the huge regional misbehavior of the 1990s, additional to those measures already 
mentioned in Section I.D.4. What can we learn from a decade of “decentralization”? Can we 
make some recommendations for future improvements? 
 
53 The meeting was held in December 4 of 1990, with the presence of President Gaviria, his Ministers of Finance 
and Public Works, the Head of DNP, the Governor of Antioquia, the Mayor of Medellin and the manager of 
ETMVA. 
54 According to our estimations, the Nation has received approximately $150 million from the execution of 
guarantees. 
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huge problems collecting and organizing the information required for this document, and the 
situation had to be much worse during the first part of the 1990s when the system was in its 
initial stages (and already exploding). Not even the banks collected information, always 
assuming that the central government would respond. A system is necessary in which some CG 
agency unifies and certifies figures reported by the TEs, with clear common accounting 
procedures for all TEs. 
Much responsibility was given to DAF, but DAF was never supposed to be a supervisory 
agency. It operated inside the Ministry of Finances, and it is not a good idea to have the “control” 
entity operating in the same place of the agency providing the money to the regions. Under those 
circumstances, the political pressure on DAF was huge.  
Colombia lacks a set of clear fiscal rules that be followed by the different governments. 
Regional finances should be an important part of these rules, which should also apply to regional 
firms and entities. In addition, there should be a special supervisory agency in charge of regional 
finances and their relations with banks, with clear rules defined in advance of any potential 
crisis. Why did the Superintendencia Bancaria allow banks to provide new credits to TEs in a 
bad situation? Likewise, it is not even clear that those risk-prone banks lost money and, if so, 
how much. Transfers to the regions should not be used as guarantees with the banking system. 
Market supervision must be brought into the picture, and international agencies such as 
Moodys could provide grades for the regions, considered by banks when designing their lending 
policies. There could be a combination of the present system of traffic lights (red lights, no new 
lending) and those grades. The yellow light should have never existed, since it created too much 
room for arbitrary behavior. 
Regional taxes are an important part of total taxes in most developed countries, but 
Colombia’s present tributary structure have created a system of incentives that discourages fiscal 
effort. The result has been low and decreasing fiscal effort by the departments, and also by 
municipalities other than Bogota.  
At the same time, no system of rules will produce the desired impact unless citizens can 
control and influence the expenditure of transfers and regional taxes. At the moment, Colombian 
citizens still think that education and health are the responsibility of the CG. The reelection of 
mayors could contribute to a change in this area, but much more is needed. 
  56New large bailouts are in the making, and it will be important to learn lessons fast. The 
social security system is broken, the electrical system is under stress, and Telecom  (the public 
telecommunication company) could become a large black hole in the future; some road 
concessions to the private sector are likely to revert to the state.  A new “Metro Law” has been 
approved, and could be instrumental in avoiding a repeat of the Medellin Metro experience, but 
it could still be declared unconstitutional. 
 
4. Conclusions   
 
Within the Latin American context Colombia ranks high in terms of decentralization. The 
process started at the beginning of the 1980s and received a big push with the new Constitution 
of 1991. The level of expenditure allocated by sub-national governments is much larger than in 
the rest of Latin America, except Brazil and Argentina, and even higher than in the average 
OECD country. Decentralization allows a better match between local preferences and the basket 
of goods (and taxes) available, but it can also weaken the fiscal discipline of sub-national 
governments.  
One key factor undermining fiscal discipline in Colombia is the model of decentralization 
implemented by the Constitution of 1991, a hybrid between the model of principal-agent and that 
of fiscal choice. The hybrid character should imply that the TE is accountable to both the CG and 
its constituents, but that has not been the case. The confusion that exists has allowed the TEs to 
avoid their responsibilities to both the CG and the citizens, and it partially explains the large 
overlaps in expenditures (at the different levels of government) that still remain. 
Substantial transfers from the central government to the sub-regions created structural 
expenditure pressures and irresponsible behavior in terms of debt (mainly loans from the banks), 
brought the departments into default and forced the central government to bail them out. The 
departments that negotiated performance agreements (PAs) with the CG, far from being 
disciplined, behaved worse than the others. The probability of this outcome, “Bailout Type 1,” 
was higher in poor, highly indebted and violent regions, where fiscal effort was low and where 
the governor belonged to the same (Liberal) party of the President. 
We considered a “Bailout Type 2” in the paper, consisting of the additional money given 
for regional education, beyond the initial budget contemplated for that purpose in the Situado 
Fiscal. The issues involved in this case are complex, however, and the amount of the bailout 
  57cannot be defined as neatly.  Part of FEC was indeed caused by a low initial budget, and part by 
the negotiations between the CG and the teacher’s union (FECODE), two stories that do not fit 
well into the classic definition of bailouts. But these two factors do not account for the whole 
story behind FEC. There is evidence in the press and evidence derived from the empirical 
analysis presented here showing that the regions massively appointed new teachers and forced 
the CG to bail them out later on with the additional funds required. 
Finally considered was the case of the Medellin rail system. Since the project could not 
be defended on technical grounds, the President (who was born in that department) and the 
government justified its undertaking on the basis of very doubtful externalities and as the 
instrument for the economic recovery of Antioquia.  
The results have dashed these expectations. The project was virtually bankrupt at the end 
of the 1980s, the Nation started servicing the train’s foreign debt, and Antioquia has recurrently 
defaulted on payments. A new Law approved in 1996 stated that the Nation would pay 40 
percent of the net present value of the debt of the Medellin Train, and a bill currently under 
consideration would increase transfers to the Medellin project from 40 to 70 percent of the total 
cost. 
The Constitution of 1991 introduced very drastic modifications in the scope and 
characteristics of decentralization in Colombia, and it would not be surprising to observe some 
costs involved in the process of “learning by doing.” The analysis of bailouts forced us to focus 
on the most problematic side of the decentralization process in Colombia, but not all the news is 
bad.  
In fact, the recent evidence and the new laws passed by Congress allow for some 
optimism. The reforms adopted in 2000-2002 introduced some important cuts in regional 
expenditures, increased taxes and brought more fiscal responsibility. Regional debt is under 
relative control (unlike the experiences of Argentina or Brazil), and Colombia accepted the idea 
that rich and large TEs could decentralize faster and more productively than other small and poor 
regions, at least during a “transition period.”  
Finally, there were many examples of productive decentralization (even) during the 
chaotic years of the 1990s (Zapata and Acosta, 2001). The huge improvement in the 
administration and fiscal management of Bogota would have been inconceivable without the 
reforms introduced in the Constitution of 1991. Finally, Law 310 of 1996 introduced very 
  58stringent conditions for the construction of another Metro in Colombia (though it could still be 
declared unconstitutional). 
While this paper provides recommendations on improving the system to avoid some of 
the huge mistakes of the decentralization process in Colombia during the 1990s, these policy 
prescriptions they will not help much unless citizens start controlling and improving the 
efficiency of expenditures on education and health. Reelection of mayors could be a step in that 
direction but much more is clearly needed. Recent measures to improve regional finances, 
though, imply a return to the old principal-agent model, a step in the opposite direction. 
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  646. ANNEX TABLES 
 
Table A.1. Taxes and Transfers (% of GDP) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
1991-1999
TAXES 12.4        12.4        13.0        13.4        13.3        14.8        13.4        13.4        13.5        14.4        13.3                
  NATIONAL LEVEL 10.6        10.6        11.2        11.3        11.3        12.4        10.9        11.0        11.0        .na 11.1                
    Rent 4.6          4.7          4.4          4.1          4.0          3.8          4.3          4.1          4.1          12.4        4.2                  
    Value Added Tax 2.8          3.4          4.4          4.3          4.2          4.8          4.9          4.8          4.2          12.4        4.2                  
    Foreign Commerce 1.4          0.9          1.1          1.1          1.0          0.9          1.1          1.0          0.9          13.0        1.0                  
    Others 1.8          1.7          1.4          1.9          2.0          2.9          0.6          1.1          1.7          13.4        1.7                  
  DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL 1.0          0.9          0.9          0.8          0.8          0.9          0.9          0.8          0.9          13.3        0.9                  
    Liquor 0.4          0.4          0.4          0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          14.8        0.3                  
    Beer 0.3          0.3          0.2          0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          13.4        0.3                  
    Cigarette 0.2          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          13.4        0.1                  
    Vehicles 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          13.5        0.1                  
    Others 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          0.2          0.1          0.2          14.4        0.1                  
  MUNICIPAL LEVEL 0.8          0.9          1.0          1.2          1.2          1.5          1.5          1.6          1.7          #N/A 1.3                  
    Industry and Commerce 0.4          0.4          0.4          0.5          0.5          0.6          0.6          0.7          0.7          .na 0.5                  
    Property tax 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.4          0.4          0.5          0.5          0.6          0.6          .na 0.4                  
    Vehicles 0.0          0.0          0.0          0.1          0.0          0.1          -          -          -          .na 0.0                  
    Others 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          0.3          0.4          0.4          0.4          .na 0.3                  
  TRANSFERS 3.0          3.7          3.9          4.1          4.1          5.7          5.4          5.1          6.3          6.3          4.6                  
    Situado Fiscal 1.7          2.0          2.1          2.2          2.2          2.6          2.4          2.3          3.1          2.6          2.3                  
    Participation 0.9          1.1          1.3          1.2          1.3          1.5          1.6          1.8          2.1          1.9          1.4                  
FEC (Educational Compensation 
Fund)
-          -          -          -          -          0.1          0.3          0.5          0.3          0.7          0.1                  
    Cofinancing 0.4          0.5          0.5          0.6          0.7          0.9          0.6          -          -          -          0.5                  
    Royalties -          -          -          -          -          0.5          0.5          0.5          0.8          1.1          0.3                  
Source: Contraloría General de la República, Banco de la República, Steiner and Soto (1999), author’s Calculations.
Taxes and Transfers (% of GDP)
 
            Table A.2. 
Credits Approved: Short-Term “Créditos de Tesorería,” Performance Agreements 
and Pasffiet Millions of Col $ 
 
PASFFIET * Performance Agreements TESORERIA *** TOTAL





Bolivar 5,015 5,015 9,913 12,000 21,913 26,928
Boyaca 4,000 4,000 4,000
Caldas
Caqueta 5,494 5,494 5,494
Casanare
Cauca 6,803 6,803 6,803
Cesar 652 652 652
Choco 3,000 1,100 3,000 7,100 7,100
Cordoba 11,885 11,885 11,885
Cundinamarca
Guainia
Guajira 3,700 3,700 3,700
Guaviare
Huila 10,742 10,742 4,920 4,920 15,662
Magdalena 10,070 10,070 4,220 5,620 9,840 19,910
Meta
Narino 2,860 2,860 2,860
Norte de Santander 1,500 1,500 590 590 2,090
Putumayo 3,200 1,000 1,200 4,500 9,900 9,900
Quindio
Risaralda 4,000 4,000 4,000
San Andres y Providencia 5,000 5,000 5,000
Santander 26,462 26,462 26,462
Sucre
Tolima 14,220 25,651 39,871 39,871
Valle del Cauca 24,828 17,460 42,288 42,288
Vaupes
Vichada
TOTAL DEPARTAMENTOS 6,146 10,742 21,888 38,776 9,060 7,300 1,200 4,500 3,000 25,060 53,771 116,998 170,769 234,605
Barranquilla 2,101 2,000 4,101 4,101
Cali 21,000 21,000 21,000
Candelaria (Valle)
Cartagena 4,700 4,700 4,700
Copacabana (Antioquia)
Ibague 3,590 3,590 9,967 12,632 22,599 26,189
Itsmina
Lebrija (Santander)
Monteria 3,629 3,629 3,629
Palmira 5,000 5,000 5,000
Plato (Magdalena)
Quibdo
Santafe de Bogota D.C.
Santa Marta 4,100 4,100 4,100
Sincelejo
Sogamoso 898 898 898
Tibu
Tulua 2,100 2,100 2,100
Tunja
T O T A L  M U N I C I P I O S 0 4 , 4 8 8 3 , 6 2 9 8 , 1 1 7 0000 00 1 6 , 7 6 8 4 6 , 8 3 2 6 3 , 6 0 0 7 1 , 7 1 7
TOTAL DEPTOS Y MUN 6,146 15,230 25,517 46,893 9,060 7,300 1,200 4,500 3,000 25,060 70,539 163,830 234,369 306,322
* At sept 30, 1999
Source: Dirección General de Apoyo Fiscal, Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público  
 
  66Table A. 3. 
Diagnostic of the Situation of Departments in the Performance Agreements 
  
DIAGNOSTIC Atl Bol Cau Caq Ces Cho Gua Hui Mag Met Nar Nor Put Tol Vall CASES
Current Deficit XX X X X X X X X X XX X 13
Accelerated increment in expenditure XXXXXXXXXXX X X X 14
High dependence on transfers, XX X 3
cofinancing and royalties in some cases
Existence of non-authorixed remuneration XX 2
Increase in personnel expenditure
that has increased long term liabilities XXX XXXX XXXX 11
High indebtedness XX X X X X X X X X X X 12
Inefficient organizational structure XX X X X X 6
High levels of liquidity XX X 3
Deficient behavior of revenues XX X X X X X X X X X 11
Loss in dynamism of revenue collection XX X X X X X X 8
Defficiencies in budget management XX 2
Judiciary processes XX 2
 
 
  67